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ABSTRACT 
Flax is one of the major cash crops in Canada. Approximately seventy percent of Canadian 
flaxseed was exported to European Union (EU) annually until 2009. In 2009, the EU imposed an 
import ban on Canadian flaxseed due to the adventitious presence of a GM flax variety - CDC 
Triffid was identified in Canadian flaxseed exported to the EU. The EU‘s decision to apply zero 
tolerance on CDC Triffid flax has been based on its interpretation of the precautionary principle. 
According to the World Trade Organisation‘s Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures (SPS), however, precautionary measures are subject to a scientific risk 
assessment. As the EU did not base its zero tolerance for CDC Triffid flax on any scientific risk 
assessment, the EU is in violation of the SPS Agreement. Moreover, the EU has ignored the 
available scientific information regarding CDC Triffid flax.  The EU did not consider the 
possibility of following the guidelines given by Codex Alimentarius Commission in the case of 
CDC Triffid flax. There are non-scientific reasons behind the EU‘s zero tolerance on CDC 
Triffid flax and they overweigh the available scientific information. The EU position would be 
unlikely to be supported if a complaint was brought to the World Trade Organisation Disputes 
Panel. 
A partial equilibrium model was used to provide a theoretical background to examine the 
changes in the flaxseed industry and the linseed oil industry due to the CDC Triffid event. A 
model of the supply chain of Canadian flaxseed was developed to illustrate the operationalisation 
of the Protocol developed by the EU and Canada to address the zero tolerance policy. Empirical 
estimation suggests that the operationalisation of the Protocol incurred additional cost of $7.5 
million to the flax seed industry of Canada in 2009/ 2010. Out of that, cost of testing was 
approximately $1.2 million and cost of segregation was $4.2 million.  
Estimation of changes in revenue suggests that there was a loss of revenue in flaxseed trade 
between the EU and Canada in 2009/2010. Imports of Canadian flax by China provided an 
alternative market, at a considerably lower price than typically realised from the EU market. 
Interestingly, the EU‘s zero tolerance policy on CDC Triffid flax has resulted in a larger 
additional cost on the EU than Canada.  
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Chapter 1 : Introduction 
 
1.1 Background 
Cultivated flax (Linum usitatissimum L.) is of two types: one is grown for oilseed production and 
the other for fibre production. In Canada, only flax for oilseed is produced commercially. 
Flaxseed is used primarily in industrial applications but has secondary uses in animal feed and 
human food
1
. In recent years, flaxseed has become popular as a human nutritional oil seed 
because of its ‗omega- 3 fatty acid‘ content.  
Canada is the world's largest producer and exporter of flaxseed; sometimes called linseed. Flax is 
one of Canada‘s major cash-crops, alongside wheat, barley, oats, peas, lentils, soybean, corn and 
canola. In the 2008/2009 crop year Canada produced 861 000 tonnes of flaxseed and exported 
639 000 tonnes out of that production (74%). The area harvested was 625 000 ha
2
. The export 
value of flaxseed was $319.5 million (Agriculture and Agri-food Canada, 2010) in 2009. 
Flaxseed accounted for nearly one percent of the agricultural export earnings of Canada in 2009
3
 
(Statistics Canada, 2010a). Canadian flax has been exported mainly to the European Union, the 
U.S., China and Japan.  
1.2 Research Problem 
The well developed Canadian flaxseed export market has faced a major challenge in the 
European Union (EU) since 2009. On September 8, 2009, the European Commission's Rapid 
Alert System for Food and Feed issued a notification that a commercial lab in Germany had 
                                                          
1
The output of the crop is commonly known as ―Flaxseed‖ which has a number of uses. 
 
2
 Harvested areas of all wheat, barley and canola in 2008/2009 were 10 032 000 ha, 3 502 000 ha and 6 494 000 ha 
respectively (Agriculture and Agri-food Canada, 2010). 
 
3 Wheat (except Durum) accounts for nearly 12% of the agricultural export earnings while canola accounts for 
nearly 9% of the agricultural export earnings of Canada in 2009 (Statistics Canada, 2010a , Agriculture and Agri-
food Canada, 2010). 
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detected the presence of unauthorised genetically modified
4
 (GM) flax in a bakery product.  The 
EU has a ‗zero tolerance‘5 policy for products containing unauthorized genetically modified 
organisms (GMO).  According to the Flax Council of Canada (2009a), the laboratories in the EU 
claim the GMO material is FP967
6
, commonly known as CDC
7
 Triffid, which was developed in 
Canada in late 1980s. CDC Triffid was registered by Canadian authorities for feed and 
environmental release in 1996 and for human consumption in 1999. CDC Triffid underwent a 
full food, feed and environmental risk assessment before licencing and was approved and 
authorized by Canadian and United States governments (Flax Council of Canada, 2009a). In 
2001, however, it was deregistered due to fear of losing the main market for Canadian flax in the 
wake of the EU placing a moratorium on the import of GM crops in 1998.  
The discovery of GM flax in September 2009 lead to widespread product recalls in the EU, 
quarantined shipments of flax from Canada, and a decline in prices received by Canadian flax 
farmers. Prior to the discovery of GM flax in the EU, approximately 70 percent of Canada‘s flax 
was exported to the EU and the loss of this major market represents a significant economic loss 
to Canadian flax growers. Under International Trade Law, to which both the EU and Canada 
subscribe, the basis of this market closure to Canadian flax by the EU is governed under the 
Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS) of the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO).  
Concerns relating to the potential trade distortions created by domestic food safety regulations 
led to the establishment of SPS agreement of WTO (Issac, 2007). SPS measures are often put in 
place for legitimate reasons. They can, however, be used in nefarious ways for protectionist 
purposes in importing countries. Therefore, when developing international trade rules for the 
application of SPS barriers to trade, legitimate concerns should be the only basis. In the WTO‘s 
Uruguay Round it was agreed that science would be the sole criteria for the imposition of SPS 
                                                          
4 An organism, such as a plant, animal or bacterium, is considered as genetically modified if its genetic material 
(DNA) has been altered (CFIA, 2010). 
5
 EU does not allow imported food and animal feed to contain GMOs that have not been authorised in the EU.   
 
6
 CDC Triffid is referred by its experimental number 12115, its national field testing number FP967 or by its 
registered name CDC Triffid. These designations all refer to the same genotype of flax (McHughen et al, 1997).  
 
7
 CDC refers to Crop Development Center of the University of Saskatchewan. 
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barriers. Since that time, it has become increasingly apparent that science is unable to effectively 
guarantee a sufficient degree of secure market access for agricultural exporters under the current 
international legal architecture (Smyth et al, 2011).  
The recent import restriction on Canadian flax imposed by the EU is the latest manifestation of 
the non-efficacy of science-based criteria. Thus, is seems that after 15 years a review of scientific 
criteria as a basis for trade barriers is overdue. In future, major Canadian crops such as wheat are 
also vulnerable to similar regulatory failures/abuse as genetic engineering technology is applied 
to additional crops. According to Kerr (2003), science-based rules of trade have become a mantra 
for some. Also, they have become an anathema to others because such mechanisms produce 
undesirable outcomes from their perspective. Thus, beyond the issue of the use of 
biotechnology
8
, there are a number of important issues pertaining to science-based rules of trade 
that warrant serious examination in the flax trade dispute.  
‘Zero tolerance‘ of CDC Triffid in the EU has created dramatic increases in the costs associated 
with flaxseed trade, reductions in producer prices and loss of processor and consumer access to 
this product in the EU. According to the Flax Council of Canada (2009a) no bulk handling 
system, no identity preserved system, no channeling system can manage the flow of exports to a 
level of zero tolerance. Furthermore, the EU closure of the Canadian flaxseed market through the 
ability to exploit the lack of transparency in the science-based rules of trade has induced some 
Canadian farmers to seek legislative actions to protect themselves. Controversial Bill C-474
9
 is 
one example. It shows the loss of confidence in the WTO, and other international trade 
institutions, by farmers. Therefore, understanding the lack of efficacy of science-based trade 
rules and the impacts of such lack of efficacy are worthy topics for investigation.  
                                                          
8 Biotechnology refers to the application of scientific and engineering principles to the processing of materials by 
biological agents to provide goods and services (OECD, 1982). 
 
9
 Bill C-474 requests an amendment to Seed Regulations Act of Canada to require an analysis of potential harm to 
export markets to be conducted before the sale of any new genetically engineered seed is permitted (Public Works 
and Government Services, 2009). 
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1.3 Research Objectives 
Over the last fifteen years since science-based criteria were enshrined in the WTO, Western 
Canadian farmers have suffered considerable economic harm as a result of the poor structuring 
of scientific criteria in the SPS Agreement. This has led to questionable use of SPS rationales as 
justifications for the imposition of trade bans and restrictions. At present, Canadian flax farmers 
are facing a dilemma as to how to market their flaxseed in the face of the discovery of the 
adventitious presence
10
 of GM flax in the EU market, which has been their major market for 
flaxseed.  Hence, an examination of the operationalisation of zero tolerance is a necessary first 
step in improving the security of market access for Western Canadian farmers. In order to 
achieve that goal, this thesis has two objectives: (1) to examine whether the EU policies used to 
disrupt Canadian flax exports are compliant with the EU‘s SPS obligations; and (2) to estimate 
the additional costs and changes in revenue associated with the trade restrictions on Canadian 
flaxseed by the EU. 
1.4 Outline of the thesis 
This thesis is comprised of six chapters. The next chapter provides an analysis of the GMO 
policies of the EU. The chapter explains how GMO policies changed over time in the EU. It 
focuses primarily on the adventitious presence of unauthorised GMOs in food supply chains of 
the EU. Furthermore, Chapter Two explains the role of SPS Agreement in CDC Triffid flax 
incident. Chapter Three explains the EU‘s market restriction on Canadian flaxseed and the 
operationalisation of Protocol developed by Canada and EU. In addition, the chapter gives a 
theoretical explanation of changes in flaxseed market and linseed oil market after the CDC 
Triffid event. Chapter Four gives an overview of the flaxseed industry. The chapter explains the 
importance of export market to Canadian flaxseed industry. Chapter Five estimates the additional 
cost associated with the adventitious presence of CDC Triffid in the flaxseed supply chain. 
Chapter Six provides the summary and conclusions. 
                                                          
10 Adventitious presence means the unintended, technically unavoidable presence of genetically engineered material 
in an Agri-food commodity (Agriculture and Agri-food Canada, 2007a). 
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Chapter 2 : GMO Policy of EU and the SPS Agreement  
 
2.1 Introduction 
Trade disputes arise when countries differ in their interpretations of their commitments made 
under international trade agreements. Both Canada and EU are members of the WTO and have 
made commitments under the WTO, and in particular the WTO‘s Agreement on Application of 
SPS Measures. They differ over their interpretation of the commitment to market access 
pertaining to the use of science in the decisions. One particularly contentious issue is market 
access for GMOs.  The EU bans imports and sales of a large number of GMOs and their products 
while in Canada, a considerable proportion of the production of some crops, such as canola or 
soybeans, arise from the use of genetically modified seeds. Similar to Canada, a number of other 
countries are increasing their acreage under GM crops. According to ISAAA (2009), more than 
77 percent of soybean, 49 percent of cotton, 26 percent of maize and 21 percent of canola and 
oilseed rape grown globally were genetically modified. Table 2.1 reports the global area of GM 
crops in 2009. 
 
Table 2.1: Global area of GM crops in 2009: by major producing countries  
Rank  Country  Area  
(million hectares)  
GM crops 
1  USA  64  Soybean, maize, cotton, canola, squash, 
papaya, alfalfa, sugar beet  
2  Brazil 21.4  Soybean, maize, cotton  
3  Argentina  21.3  Soybean, maize, cotton  
4  India  8.4  Cotton  
5  Canada  8.2  Canola, maize, soybean, sugar beet 
6  China  3.7  Cotton, tomato, poplar, papaya, sweet 
pepper  
7  Paraguay  2.2  Soybean  
8  South Africa  2.1  Maize, soybean, cotton  
9  Uruguay  0.8  Soybean, maize  
10  Bolivia  0.8  Soybean  
Source: (ISAAA, 2009) 
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The global area of GM crops in 2009 reached 134 million hectares. The annual growth rate is 7 
percent. In contrast, the EU experienced a 12 percent (9796 ha) decrease of GM crop area from 
2008 to 2009. In 2009, of the 27 countries in the European Union, only six countries officially 
planted GM maize on a commercial basis. The six EU countries  which  grew GM maize  in 
2009  were  Spain, the Czech  Republic,  Portugal,  Romania,  Poland  and  Slovakia. In 2009, 
Germany discontinued planting GM crops. Spain was the largest EU grower of GM crop with 80 
percent of the EU‘s total GM maize area and a adoption rate of 22 percent. The 2009 hectarege 
in the six EU countries was 94,750 hectares, i.e. 0.07 percent of the global area under GM crops 
(ISAAA, 2009). The only commercially cultivated GM crop in EU until 2010 was insect 
resistant Bt maize
11
, which was approved in 1998. From 1999 to 2003 the EU had a moratorium 
on approving new varieties of GM crops. On March 13, 2010, the EU approved the first GM 
crop under its 2003 proceedings; GM potato EH92-527-1
12
 for commercial cultivation (EC, 
2010b). 
As of January 2011, 39 GM foods and feeds are authorised to be used in EU (EC, 2010b). This 
chapter outlines the GMO import regulations in EU, and the role of international trade rules in 
the context of trade in GM crops. This discussion which is based on a review of the available 
literature, assists in understanding the present trade dispute between EU and Canada over the 
adventitious presence of GM flaxseed in conventional flaxseed export shipments. The zero 
tolerance policy of the EU regarding contamination of flax shipments has caused significant 
economic losses for the flaxseed industries in both Canada and the EU.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
11 Bt maize contains a gene from the soil bacteria Bacillus thuringiensis that protects against the European corn 
borer, an important pest affecting maize crops. 
12
 The genetically modified potato EH92-527-1, has an altered starch composition (higher amylopentin/amylase 
ratio). 
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2.2 EU GM policy  
The first main legislation related to GMOs in EU was the Directive 90/220/EEC in 1990. The 
objective of this Directive was to approximate the laws, regulations and administrative 
provisions of the Member States and to protect human health and the environment when GMOs 
were being consumed or release into the ecosystems (EC, 2003). Two main areas were addressed 
in Directive 90/220. The first dealt with the deliberate release of GMOs into the environment. 
The second aspect concerned the placing of products containing, or consisting of, GMOs which 
were intended for subsequent deliberate release into the environment into the EU market 
(Belgiun Bio-safety Server, 1992).  
Products derived from GMOs, such as paste or ketchup from a GM tomato were not covered by 
Directive 90/220/EEC but covered by the Regulation on Novel Foods and Novel Food 
Ingredients which was introduced on 27 January 1997 (Regulation (EC) 258/97) (EC, 2003). 
Directive 90/220/EC was replaced by Directive 2001/18/EC in 2001. As explained in EC 
(2010b), Directive 2001/18/EC introduced number of new requirements such as;  
 principles for environmental risk assessment,  
 mandatory post-market monitoring requirements,  
 mandatory information to the public, 
 a requirement for Member States to ensure labelling and traceability at all stages of 
placing the product in the market,  
 information to allow the identification and detection of GMOs to facilitate post-market 
inspection and control,  
 first approvals for the release of GMOs to be limited to a maximum of ten years, the 
consultation of the Scientific Committee(s)/European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) to be 
obligatory, and 
 an obligation to inform the European Parliament on decisions to authorise the release of 
GMOs and the possibility for the Council of Ministers to adopt or reject a Commission 
proposal for authorisation of a GMO by qualified majority, etc.  
Directive 2001/18/EC represents the present regulations pertaining to deliberate release of GMO 
into the environment (Europa, 2008). 
The EU‘s present regulation for GM food and feed is Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 (EU, 
2003). Further, there are two amendments of that Regulation done in 2006 and 2008; Regulation 
17 
 
(EC) No 1981/2006  and Regulation (EC) No 298/2008. These regulations introduced a 
centralised procedure of authorisation of GM food and feed and also introduced rules for the 
labelling of GM food and feed and a threshold for the presence of GM material that is 
adventitious or technically unavoidable (EU, 2010a). The Regulation applies to three types of 
products: 
 GMOs for food and feed use; 
 food and feed containing GMOs; and 
 food and feed produced from or containing ingredients produced from GMOs. 
The authorisation procedure is explained through Articles 1 to 15, while regulation of labelling 
comes under Articles 17 to 23 of the Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003. Regulation (EC) No 
1830/2003 also deals with the traceability and labelling of GMOs and traceability and labelling 
of food and feed products produced from GMOs (EU, 2003). Regulation (EC) No 1830/2003  
was developed alongside Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 and the two regulations are intended to 
operate in tandem and cross-rely on each other for certain requirements (EC, 2006). 
Additionally, a another legal instrument also plays a role in the marketing of GMOs within the 
EU namely, Regulation (EC) 178/2002, which lays down the general principles of food law, and 
establishes the European Food Safety Authority (EC, 2010c and EC, 2002).  
In the case of Canadian flaxseed, while used primarily for industrial applications, it is also used 
as food and as feed in the EU. Therefore, the EU regulations related to food and feed are relevant 
to Canadian flaxseed used in the EU. In other words, regulations related to the deliberate release 
of GMOs into the environment are not considered in the case of CDC Trifid. Moreover, as there 
are only traces of GM flaxseed in shipments, the regulations related to the threshold for the 
presence of GM material that is adventitious or technically unavoidable are the most relevant for 
Canadian flaxseed imports in Europe. Therefore, this chapter focuses primarily on the EU 
regulations regarding adventitious or technically unavoidable presence of GMOs.  
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2.2.1 The EU threshold for adventitious presence of GMOs  
There are two possible scenarios for the adventitious or technically unavoidable presence of 
GMOs in food or feed. The first is the presence of approved GMOs in non-GM food or feed. The 
second one is unapproved
13
 GMOs in non-GM food or feed. At the international level, problems 
already exist in both scenarios because there is no consistent and harmonised set of rules to 
facilitate international trade in GM crops. In the United States, Canada, Japan, and Taiwan, food 
with a content of up to 5 percent of approved GM material can be classified as ―non-GM;‖ 
however, in Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, Brazil, or China, all food with more than 1 
percent of approved GM material has to be labelled as ―GM‖  (Stein and Cereso, 2010). In the 
EU, the threshold
14
 for adventitious or technically unavoidable presence of approved GMOs in 
food and feed is 0.9 percent, i.e. food and feed with more than 0.9 percent of approved GM 
material has to be labelled as ―GM‖ (EC, 2006).  
The basis upon which these thresholds were decided was the technically feasible level of 
detection of the GMOs in the non-GM material. For example, as explained by European Seed 
Association and European Association for Bioindustries (2007), in the production of 
conventional seed, visual detection is used to identify the adventitious presence of off-types. For 
example, in hybrid maize varieties, the documented average level of impurities detected visually 
over the past few years has been around 0.7 percent. However, with the development of modern 
molecular detection tools, specific known DNA sequences of GMOs can be identified at very 
low levels. 
The real controversy arises when there is asynchronous authorisation for GMOs. Asynchronous 
authorisation occurs when a certain GM crop has been evaluated for its safety and authorised in 
the exporting country whereas the importing country has not authorised it. As explained by 
Magnier et al. (2009) asynchronicity has become a significant problem for broadly traded 
commodities. The main reason is perfect segregation of approved from unapproved GM crops is 
difficult within the global agricultural trade system. Comingling of a non-authorised GMO might 
                                                          
13 Any product that has not received authorisation in a jurisdiction for import, food consumption, use as livestock 
feed, and/or environmental release (Agri-food Canada, CFIA, CGC, 2004). 
 
14
 The minimum level of presence at which certain conditions apply; for example, declaration of presence on a label 
(Agri-food Canada, CFIA, CGC, 2004). 
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occur in conventional or other GM food as a result of adventitious or technically unavoidable 
presence during seed production, cultivation, harvest, transport or processing in the exporting 
country (Europa, 2010). Regulation 1829/2003 gave a threshold for the adventitious and 
technically unavoidable presence of GM material of non-authorised GMOs under the condition 
that a safety assessment had been carried out at EU level and that detection methods were 
publicly available. Under these conditions, material from these GMOs was tolerated up to 0.5 
percent in food and feed. The reason for the transitional measure was to ensure a smooth 
transition to the new authorisation regime, i.e. Regulation 1829/2003, from the old authorisation 
regime; i.e. Regulation (EC) No 258/97 and Directive 2001/18/EC (EC, 2006).   
This temporary threshold level however, expired in April 2007 bringing the level of tolerance to 
zero for all GM material not authorised in the EU (EC, 2008a). This is the main controversial 
point of the CDC Triffid flax event. As explained in Chapter 1, CDC Triffid flax was an 
authorised crop in Canada, but voluntarily withdrawn in 2001 and it is not authorised in the EU. 
Therefore, it creates an asynchronous authorisation situation and the EU has zero tolerance for 
the adventitious and technically unavoidable presence of CDC Triffid flax in conventional 
flaxseed. A zero presence of GMOs, however, is difficult to prove for exporters and therefore a 
testing Protocol is required to provide evidence that the requirement for zero has been met.  
In the literature there are number of incidents that have already been reported under this low 
level presence (LLP) of unauthorised GMOs. As explained by Stein and Cereso (2010), currently 
there are about 30 commercial GM crops that are cultivated worldwide, the forecast is that by 
2015 there will be more than 120. This may lead to a potential increase in the number of LLP 
incidents in GM crops worldwide.  According to Backus et al (2008), it is likely that in the near 
future more trade problems will occur with the EU import of raw materials from exporting 
countries where more GMOs have already been approved or are under development. Therefore, 
the ‗zero-tolerance‘ policy of EU towards LLP of unauthorised GMOs, is of growing concern 
due to its potential impact on international trade. 
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2.2.2 Incidents of LLP of unapproved GMOs in EU 
There are number of documented cases where unapproved GM crops found their way into the 
food and feed supply chain: GM papaya, GM rice, GM corn, GM soybean, etc. Some of these 
incidents have led to significant economic losses for the exporting countries as well as for 
importers in the EU. 
 
GM papaya 
Unauthorised GM papaya
15
 was found in imported papaya from Hawaii exported to one member 
state of EU in 2004. It was then notified to the other Member States via the Rapid Alert System 
for Food and Feed (RASFF). A specific detection method has been made available via the Joint 
Research Centre
16
 of EC (EC, 2006; EC, 2005) to identify GM papaya. The Member State 
requested the Commission to impose emergency measures in accordance with Article 53 of 
Regulation (EC) N°178/2002. These measures are;  
(i) suspension of imports of the food or feed in question from all or part of the third country 
concerned and, where applicable, from the third country of transit; 
(ii) laying down special conditions for the food or feed in question from all or part of the third 
country concerned; 
(iii) any other appropriate interim measure (EC, 2002). 
 
The Commission concluded that an emergency measure according to Article 53 of Regulation 
(EC) N° 178/2002 can only be taken on the condition that it is evident that the food or feed in 
question is likely to constitute a serious risk to human health, animal health or the environment 
                                                          
15 GM papaya has been developed to be resistant to papaya ring spot virus (PRSV) which is often a limiting factor in 
the production of papaya worldwide (Gonsalves, 2004). 
 
16
 JRC provides the scientific advice and technical know-how to support a wide range of EU policies. The JRC has 
seven scientific institutes, located at five different sites in Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Spain, with 
a wide range of laboratories and research facilities (EC Joint Research Centre, 2010). 
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and GM papaya has not met that condition. However, papaya imported from Hawaii was 
detected by custom administration and imports contaminated with GM papaya were rejected. 
RASFF has not been notified of further discoveries of this unauthorised GM since 2005 (EC, 
2006). 
According to GMO Compass (2011), as of January 12, 2011 no application for approval of GM 
papaya in EU has been submitted. Therefore, importing and marketing GM papayas is not 
authorised in the EU. However, importation of GM papaya from Hawaii has been allowed in 
Canada since January 2003, and also allowed in Japan since 2010. The impression of the 
researcher who developed GM papaya, Dr. Dennis Gonsalves, shows his lack of confidence in 
GMO regulation in EU. “Transgenic papaya will never win approval in EU, regardless of how 
much information is provided because the process is political in the EU
17” (Hawai‘i Free Press, 
2010). The GM papaya event also illustrates how anti-GMO groups like Greenpeace intervene at 
international level
18
.  
 
GM Rice  
According to Brooks (2008), the operation of a zero tolerance policy for the LLP of unauthorised 
GMOs in the EU has already had a negative impact on the EU food sector. In particular, the rice 
sector of the EU has experienced a significant cost burden as a result of trace amounts of 
unauthorised GM rice LL601
19
 being detected in long-grain rice in 2006. The EC adopted 
Decision 2006/578/EC regarding the GM rice LL601. According to that Decision, the use of the 
precautionary principle, as laid down in Article 7 of Regulation (EC) No 178/2002, was 
appropriate to prevent the placing of GM rice on the market (EU, 2006). The Decision 
2006/578/EC requested an analytical report proving GM free rice (level of detection 0.01 
                                                          
17
 All policy making is political, but in North America policy making over the GMOS‘s is mostly driven by science. 
 
18 An attempt to grow GM papaya in Thailand was stopped by Greenpeace by raiding a research trial where the 
transgenic papaya was growing.  The plant material was destroyed (Hawai‘i Free Press, 2010). 
 
19 LL601 is a GM rice variety, which was engineered by Bayer Crop Science to be tolerant to herbicides marketed 
under the brand name LibertyLink (USDA, 2006).  
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percent) be issued by an accredited laboratory which conformed to internationally recognised 
standards (EC Joint Research Center, 2006). This can be considered a similar situation to that of 
CDC Triffid flax. 
Brooks (2008) has given the costs of this zero tolerance for the presence of unapproved GM rice 
LL601 in the supply chain of the EU since 2006. At the company level (rice miller), the average 
cost of dealing with LLP of unapproved LL601 has been between €3.5 million and €7.4 million 
and at the industry level (across about 15 rice millers), the cost, as of early 2008, was between 
€52 million and €111 million. These costs were equivalent to between 6 percent and 13 percent 
of the total value of the EU long grain rice market in 2008. The costs include the cost of testing, 
cost of product withdrawal from the market, legal costs, adverse impact on brands and 
product/company image, claims for compensation from customers not covered by insurance, 
financial charges, staff time spent on dealing with the event, loss of sales and profits, etc. In the 
present study legal costs, adverse impact on brands and product/company image associated with 
EU‘s zero tolerance of CDC Triffid flax was not estimated. 
It is interesting to note the scientific support of the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) 
regarding the LLP of GM rice LL601 given in September 2006. In their risk assessment report, 
the EFSA mentioned that the available information was not sufficient to complete a 
comprehensive risk assessment, however, on the basis of available information, they concluded 
that the consumption of imported long grain rice containing trace levels of LL601 is not likely to 
pose an imminent safety concern to humans or animals (EC, 2006). 
Moreover, on November 2006, the U.S. Department of Agriculture‘s Animal and Plant Health 
Inspection Service (APHIS) also announced that after a thorough review of the scientific 
evidence it will deregulate GM rice LL601 based on the finding that it is as safe as its 
traditionally bred counterparts. The U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) concluded that 
the presence of GM rice LL601 in the food and feed supply poses no safety concerns (USDA, 
2006). 
As of March 2010, no application had been made for authorisation of GM rice LL601 in the EU.  
However, in 2010 the European Commission forwarded a proposal to Member States to lift 
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emergency measures for GM rice LL601. Meanwhile, Member States continue to check for 
traces of GM rice LL601 (EC, 2010d). 
 
GM Soybean 
GM soybean provides a good case study with which to examine the zero tolerance policy of EU. 
The EU livestock industry is highly dependent on soybeans as a main source of protein in feed. 
Approximately 75 percent of soy used in the feed industry in EU is imported, mostly from the 
US, Argentina and Brazil (Aramyan et al., 2009). Over the last few years, however, the EU has 
faced difficulties with the import of soybeans for animal feed from major exporting countries due 
to the zero tolerance policy. Aramyan et al. (2009) predict that with the expanding international 
cultivation of GM varieties, potential trade disruptions could become more severe and more 
frequent. Therefore, the authors suggest the relaxing of the zero-tolerance policy for unapproved 
GM-soybean varieties to an alternative tolerance threshold that might prevent the decline of 
imports and the problems associated with it. 
The EU soybean sector experienced market disruption due to incidents of LLP of GMOs in 2008 
and the cost of such events is estimated to be between €1 billion and €2.8 billion (Brooks, 2008). 
According to Backus et al. (2008), in 1996 the US was the largest supplier of soybeans to the EU 
(9.4 million tonnes), but in 2006 its exports has decreased to 3.4 million tonnes (22 percent of 
total imports) mainly because of LLP of unauthorised GM events. By 2006, Brazil became the 
largest source of soybeans for the EU, with a market share of 62 percent (9.7 million tonnes)
20
. 
Backus et al. (2008) assume that problems will be more severe when Brazil adopts the next 
generation of GM soybeans. Currently three GM soybean varieties are approved in the EU. 
Approved varieties are MON40-3-2, MON89788 and A2704-12. The tendency of the EU in 
approving GM soybean is quite understandable because 77 percent of world soybean production 
is genetically modified.  
 
                                                          
20
 Part of this increase in the presence of Brazilian product in the EU can, however, be attributed to the increased 
international economic competitiveness of Brazil‘s producers. 
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GM corn 
In 2005, it was found that US exports of maize products to the EU was contaminated with 
unauthorised GM maize Bt10
21
. As a result, the European Commission, with the support of 
Member States, adopted Decision 2005/317/EC and this Decision lays down the condition that 
all the maize products originating from the US have to be accompanied by a report of analysis 
demonstrating the absence of the unauthorised GM maize before being placed on the EU market 
(EC, 2006).  This is similar to the ‗Protocol‘ developed for CDC Triffid flax. 
According to GM Compass (2010a), GM maize variety MON88017
22
 was not authorised in the 
EU until 2009, even though it has been found not to pose an unacceptable risk by EFSA. 
Therefore, comingling of this unauthorised GM maize in US soybean shipments resulted in 
rejecting of US soy shipments by the EU.  However, this incident created an animal feed 
shortage in the EU. GM maize MON88017, has been authorised for cultivation in the US since 
2005. In 2005, the US applied for approval for exporting  MON88017  for food and feed to the 
EU. In April 2009, the EFSA issued its risk assessment opinion classifying MON88017 maize as 
harmless (EFSA, 2009). Based on that assessment, the European Commission prepared a 
proposal for granting authorisation, but this did not receive the support of Member States (GMO 
Compass, 2010a). This incident can be considered as one of the major draw backs faced by the 
EU due to its zero tolerance policy. However, in October 2009, the European Commission 
granted the authorisation for import of MON88017 in the EU until 2019 (EC, 2009a). 
 
GA-21 corn 
Between April 2007 and March 2008 maize exports from Argentina to the EU were temporarily 
suspended due to the LLP of an unauthorised GA-21 maize event. GA-21 maize was not 
                                                          
21 Bt10 is a GM maize line, developed in the 1990s by the company Syngenta together with Bt11 maize.  Bt10 
maize is resistant to the European corn borer. Further development of Bt10 has been discontinued prior to reaching 
the stage of regulatory approval. The accidental release occurred because some batches of Bt10 were erroneously 
labelled as Bt11 (EC, 2006). 
 
22
 MON88017 maize is resistant to the European corn borer and is also herbicide-tolerant. 
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authorised for use in feed in the EU. The import ban for Argentinean maize resulted in a price 
increase for non-GM maize. Normally, the premium for non-GM maize is US$50 per tonne but 
between April 2007 and May 2008 it was US$80-100 per tonne (Backus et al., 2008). However, 
as of March 28, 2008, GA-21 corn has been authorised under the European Commission 
Decision (2008/280/EC). 
 
2.2.3 Challenges to EU’s ‘zero tolerance policy’ 
The zero tolerance policy of the EU for unauthorised GMOs has been challenged in EU when  
the European Commission‘s Directorate-General for Agriculture and Rural Development 
published a report in June 2007 declaring that the EU‘s zero tolerance policy and asynchronous 
approvals would have negative impacts on the European pork and poultry sectors (EC, 
Directorate-General for Agriculture and Rural Development, 2007). The European 
biotechnology industry and the animal feed industry are also claiming that the EU‘s GMO policy 
is harming the EU livestock industry. Another major challenge to zero tolerance policy was the 
detection of non authorised MON88017 maize in soybean shipments from the US in 2009 
(Friends of Earth Europe, 2010a). As the EU‘s livestock industry heavily depends on soybean 
imports from the US, this incident led to an animal feed crisis in EU. As explained by Gruere 
(2009), asynchronous approval of GMOs is likely to contribute to overall inflation in food prices 
in the EU.  
In July 2008, the WHO/FAO Codex Alimentarius Commission adopted new set of simplified 
risk assessment guidelines for the temporary approval in cases of low level presence of (LLP) of 
GM products when there is asynchronous authorisation (Codex Alimentarius Commission, 
2009). In these guidelines the Codex Alimentarius Commission mentioned that commingling of 
commodities from storage, export and processing would mean only low levels of GMOs in 
individual servings of food. These new guidelines, which are explained under the Codex‘s 
Annex 3, signals the international concern pertaining to the commercial reality of traces of GM 
products in non-GM products worldwide. According to Gruere (2009), the need to find practical 
regulatory mechanisms to solve this issue has lead over 160 members of the Codex Alimentarius 
to adopt the new standard despite dramatic country differences on many aspects related to the 
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regulation of GM food. In comparison, Gruere (2009) reports that the discussions at the Codex 
Alimentarius Committee on GM food labelling have not led to agreement 16 years after it was 
first introduced.  
Due to the technical and commercial infeasibility of a zero tolerance policy, on October 29, 2010 
the European Commission presented a recommendation for a tolerable threshold of unapproved 
GMOs in agricultural imports. According to those recommendations, in the future unintentional 
impurities should be permitted up to 0.1 percent only for feed. The tolerable threshold for food is 
zero. However, the GM food producing countries, including the US, Canada, Brazil and 
Argentina, are not happy about the dividing line between food and feed and they argue it would 
lead to "insurmountable difficulties in agricultural trade" (GMO Compass, 2010b). Further, all 
the Member States of the EU must agree with this recommendation in order to have it become a 
regulation. 
Furthermore, in July 2010, the European Commission recommended that member states have 
greater freedom when deciding whether or not to allow the growing of genetically engineered 
crops in their domestic markets (ICTSD, 2010). The Commission proposed this controversial 
change as a solution to present GMO policy which has divided the EU member states for more 
than a decade. 
 
2.3  Zero tolerance policy and SPS agreements 
To explain the zero tolerance policy of the EU, in the context of international trade the WTO 
Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement), and 
the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity (Biosafety 
Protocol) are the most relevant international institutional arrangements.  
The SPS Agreement creates disciplines applicable to measures for the protection of human and 
animal life or health (sanitary measures) and of plant life or health (phytosanitary measures) 
from certain, defined risks (UN, 2003). According to the definition of an SPS measure, the 
agreement applies to measures taken; ―to protect  human or animal life from risks arising from 
additives, contaminants, toxins or disease-causing organisms in their food, beverages, feedstuffs; 
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to protect human life from plant or animal carried diseases (zoonotics); to protect animal or 
plant life from pests, diseases, or disease-causing organisms; to protect a country from damage 
caused by the entry, establishment or spread of pests” (WTO, 2010a). 
These measures allow Members of the WTO to violate the principle of non-discrimination 
(PND) which may be thought of as the baseline principle of the international trading system that 
all domestic market access rules must meet (Isaac et al., 2002). The first and second provisions 
of PND state that foreign products must be treated like domestic products and there should be no 
discrimination between products originating from different countries. However, under the SPS 
Agreement, Members may discriminate against imports because of the presence of risks to 
human, animal or plant health. In other words, Members are not required to grant either national 
treatment or most-favoured nation status to agricultural exporters whose products risk 
contaminating the domestic food supply or the environment (Isaac et al., 2002). The third 
provision of PND seems controversial in the case of biotechnology. It states that all ‗like 
products‘ are to be treated the same regardless of the process and production method (PPM) used 
in their manufacture. According to that provision, the international trading system has to deal 
with market access of products created by biotechnology, but not with the process of 
biotechnology. It is only if the GM product is physically different from the non-GM product that 
a trade measure can be justified. Thus, as it is not possible to discern the difference between a 
shirt made using GM cotton and a shirt made with non-GM cotton, a trade barrier cannot be put 
in place against shirts made with GM cotton. The use of biotechnology is a PPM and, hence, 
trade barriers should not be allowed on the basis of a product being GM. The Biosafety Protocol, 
on the other hand, considers biotechnology as an unlike product where trade barriers can be 
imposed based on technology used.  
The SPS Agreement considers science as the criterion upon which SPS measures will be 
evaluated. In other words, SPS measures must be based on scientific principles and not be 
maintained without sufficient scientific evidence except as provided for in Article 5.7. 
Article 2.2 of the SPS states that: “Members shall ensure that any sanitary or phytosanitary 
measure is applied only to the extent necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health, 
is based on scientific principles and is not maintained without sufficient scientific evidence, 
except as provided for in paragraph 7 of Article 5.” 
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Therefore, it is apparent that while the SPS Agreement acknowledges the right of countries to 
take measures to protect human, animal or plant life or health, it also expects such measures may 
only be in place if they are based on ―scientific principles‖ and are not maintained ―without 
sufficient scientific evidence‖. There are two options for countries to show their measures are 
based on science. The first one is to base their measures on international standards and the 
second one is to base them on a scientific risk assessment. 
Article 5.7 of the SPS states that: In cases where relevant scientific evidence is insufficient, 
Member may provisionally adopt sanitary or phytosanitary measures on the basis of available 
pertinent information, including that from the relevant international organisations as well as 
from sanitary or phytosanitary measures applied by other Members. In such circumstances, 
Members shall seek to obtain the additional information necessary for a more objective 
assessment of risk and review the sanitary or phytosanitary measure accordingly within a 
reasonable period of time.  
Therefore, according to Article 5.7 of the SPS Agreement, Members have a right to establish 
provisional SPS measures (trade restrictions) based on precaution, if there is not sufficient 
scientific evidence to conduct an appropriate risk assessment (Isaac et al., 2002). This use of 
‗Precautionary Principle‘ has become one of the most controversial points in the case of trade 
conflicts related to GMOs.  
According to the EC (2010b), the regulatory framework for GMOs in the EU takes account of 
the requirements of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety (BSP), and also is in line with WTO 
rules. Therefore, understanding the BSP is also important in analysing the EU regulation of 
GMOs. The BSP sets rules for international trade in living modified organisms (LMOs). LMOs 
are basically GMOs that have not been processed, and that could live if introduced into the 
environment, such as seeds. Karlson (2008) explains the difference in precautionary approach of 
BSP and that of SPS Agreement. Articles 10.6 and 11.8 of the BSP state that: 
Article 10.6:“Lack of scientific certainty due to insufficient relevant scientific information and 
knowledge regarding the extent of the potential adverse effects of a living modified organism on 
the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity in the Party of import, taking also 
into account risks to human health, shall not prevent that Party from taking a decision, as 
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appropriate, with regard to the import of the living modified organism in question as referred to 
in paragraph 3 above, in order to avoid or minimise such potential adverse effects.” 
Article 11.8: ―Lack of scientific certainty due to insufficient relevant scientific information and 
knowledge regarding the extent of the potential adverse effects of a living modified organism on 
the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity in the Party of import, taking also 
into account risks to human health, shall not prevent that Party from taking a decision, as 
appropriate, with regard to the import of that living modified organism intended for direct use as 
food or feed, or for processing, in order to avoid or minimise such potential adverse 
effects”(Convention of Biological Diversity, 2011). 
Karlson (2008), argues that according to the rules in the BSP, the importing country has 
complete authority over the review of its decision and exporters have no means to overturn it, no 
matter what reasoning is used to justify the restrictive measure. In addition, there is no 
requirement for the importing country to seek the information necessary to reach scientific 
certainty, so a trade-restrictive measure may be in force without time limits.  However, as 
explained by Hobbs et al. (2005), major producers and exporters of agricultural crops based on 
biotechnology (e.g. the US, Canada, China and Argentina) have not ratified the BSP and it will 
become a failed multilateral environment agreement and potentially evolve into a protectionist 
club. The WTO remains the only multilateral organisation to encompass most of the GM 
producing and potential importing countries. 
As explained by Isacc et al. (2002) Canada is a member of WTO and a BSP signatory but it has 
not ratified the BSP. For Canada, the WTO rules should apply. Therefore, in the case of the CDC 
Triffid event, international trade based on WTO rules is valid for Canada, not those of the BSP. 
Section 2.3.1 explores trade disputes related to the SPS Agreement of WTO.  
 
2.3.1 Trade disputes related to SPS Agreement 
According to the WTO (2010a), Canada has been party to 33 complaints brought to the WTO 
Dispute Settlement Body (DSB). Out of those complaints, 15 cases were against US and nine 
cases were against the EU. Out of nine complaints against EU, three were based on violation of 
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the SPS Agreement. Out of those three complains, one is related to export of biotechnology 
products to the EU.  
In 2003, Canada claimed (case number DS292) that the moratorium on the approval of 
biotechnology products applied by the EU since October 1998 had unfairly restricted imports of 
agricultural and food products from Canada (WTO, 2010c). The US and Argentina also made the 
same complains against the EU (Case numbers are DS291 and DS293 respectively). According 
to Smyth et al. (2006) Canada‘s share of the EU canola imports fell from 14 percent in 1990-
1996 to 2 percent in 1997-2003.  The EU, however, denied the existence of such a moratorium. 
According to Canada, the measures at issue appeared to be inconsistent with the EU‘s 
obligations under: Articles 2.2, 2.3, 5.1, 5.5, 5.6, 7 and 8, and Annexes B and C of the SPS 
Agreement (WTO, 2010c). 
The Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) established a single Panel to examine this dispute. After a 
very lengthy procedure, in 2006 the Panel found that the EU applied a general de facto 
moratorium on the approval of biotechnology products between June 1999 and August 2003. 
Furthermore, the panel found that, by applying this general moratorium, and taking measures 
related to the approval of specific biotechnology products, the EU had acted inconsistently with 
its obligations under the SPS Agreement (WTO, 2010c).  With regard to the prohibiting the 
import/marketing of specific biotechnology products by Member States, the Panel found that the 
EU acted inconsistently with its obligations under Articles 5.1 and 2.2 of the SPS Agreement. 
The main reason given was that those measures were not based on a risk assessment as required 
under Art. 5.1 and defined in Annex A(4). In 2009, Canada and the EU agreed to establish 
mutually agreed solution to this trade dispute (WTO, 2010c). 
The other main trade dispute related to the SPS Agreement is the dispute regarding imports of 
beef produced using growth hormones. The EU‘s ban on the importation of livestock and meat 
from livestock that have been treated with hormones were opposed by both US and Canada. In 
1996, Canada requested consultations with the EU regarding this ban. The Canadian claim was 
the same as the US claim (WT/DS26), for which a Panel had been established. The Panel found 
that the EU ban on imports of meat and meat products from cattle treated with any of six specific 
hormones for growth promotion purposes was inconsistent with Articles 3.1, 5.1 and 5.5 of the 
SPS Agreement (WTO, 2010b).  
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However, in 1997, based on the appeal of the EU, the Appellate Body of the WTO dispute 
settlement system found that the EU import prohibition was inconsistent with Articles 3.3 and 
5.1 of the SPS Agreement.  A major part of the finding of the Appellate Body was that the EU 
had not carried out an adequate risk assessment. The EU was asked to open its market to beef 
produced using hormones, but it failed to comply. Canada and the US were in the position to 
retaliate. In 1999, Canada, requested authorisation from the DSB for the suspension of 
concessions to the EU in the amount of CAN$75 million. The arbitrators determined the level of 
nullification suffered by Canada to be equal to CDN$11.3 million annually. The DSB permitted 
the imposition of retaliatory duties against the EU by Canada in 1999 (WTO, 2010b). The US 
has also been permitted to suspend tariff concessions to the value of US$116.8 million per year. 
This became the first commercial dispute settled by the WTO under the SPS Agreement.  
After Canada‘s retaliation under the DSB, the EU initiated 17 scientific studies to assess the 
safety of the hormones concerned. On the basis of these Opinions, in 2005, the EU initiated new 
WTO dispute settlement proceedings against Canada (as well as the US). After lengthy 
proceedings, the WTO panel reported that the EU ban was inconsistent with the WTO rules, but 
also found Canada to be in violation of certain procedural issues
23
 (Foreign Affairs and 
International Trade Canada, 2008). 
On May 29, 2008, the EU filed a Notice of Appeal of the report of WTO panel. The Appellate 
Body found that Canada is not in violation of any WTO obligations by imposing retaliatory 
duties against the EU. Their report also expressed concern with the EU‘s failure to comply with 
the recommendations and rulings of the DSB. It further confirmed that the DSB‘s 
recommendations and rulings in the original EU-Hormones dispute remain operative and binding 
on the EU (Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, 2008). Following a series of 
negotiations, the United States and the EU and Canada and the EU have separately agreed to 
settlements that could resolve this long-standing trade dispute. However, the EU market remains 
closed to beef produced using hormones. 
                                                          
23 WTO panel found that Canada was in violation of WTO obligations by unilaterally determining Directive 
2003/74/EC is WTO inconsistent. 
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There have been approximately 37 trade disputes over SPS measures other than two disputes 
mentioned above (WTO, 2010a). Controversial disputes include the dispute between the US and 
Japan over Japan‘s phytosanitary measures on imports of US apples, the dispute between Canada 
and Australia over Australia‘s ban on imports of Canadian fresh, chilled and frosen salmon and 
the dispute between Canada and South Korea over South Korea‘s measures on imports of bovine 
meat and meat products from Canada, etc. Most of the disputes were based on violations of 
Article 2 and Article 5. Article 2 pertains to scientific principles and Article 5 pertains to risk 
assessments. Therefore, it is apparent that taking SPS measures based on scientific principles and 
proving there is a risk using a risk assessment were the most commonly violated parts of the SPS 
Agreement. As explained by Kerr (2003), in order to put in place measures justified on SPS 
grounds, a country should prove that there is a scientific reason for the trade restriction and also 
there should be a risk related to imports of the restricted products. If the identified scientific 
problem does not pose a risk it cannot be used as a reason to impose a trade barrier.  In the case 
of CDC Triffid flax the EU‘s trade restriction can be considered as an invocation of the 
precautionary principle. Therefore, understanding the scientific rationale behind the 
precautionary principle is important in analysing the EU‘s zero tolerance policy on CDC Triffid 
flax. Section 2.4 examines the precautionary principle as a justification for the zero tolerance 
policy of the EU.   
 
2.4 The precautionary principle 
According to Giampiatro (2002), the trade dispute between the EU and the US over GMOs is 
putting the precautionary principle onto the political agenda of both parties. Within the EU, the 
precautionary principle is generating disagreements between the Commission and individual 
member states. As explained by Sandin (2005), the precautionary principle has critics, and it has 
been subject to severe suspicion and disagreement. One objection is that the precautionary 
principle is ill defined, and therefore it can be used to ban anything. Another objection is that the 
precautionary principle allows science only a marginalised role in decision making. In the 
Communication published in 2000, the EU defines the precautionary principle as follows. 
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“The Precautionary Principle covers those specific circumstances where scientific 
evidence is insufficient, inconclusive or uncertain and there are indications through 
preliminary objective scientific evaluation that there are reasonable grounds for 
concern that the potentially dangerous effects on the environment, human, animal or 
plant health may be inconsistent with the chosen level of protection” (European 
Commission 2000, p. 10). 
This can be considered as an important point in the case of CDC Triffid flax. Even though there 
was enough scientific evidence to satisfy Canadian regulations that CDC Triffid flax would not 
pose potentially dangerous effects on environment, human, animal or plant health, the EU can 
still consider that the existing evidence is not sufficient, inconclusive or uncertain. This creates 
an interesting problem of what is the threshold of scientific evidence to be considered safe by the 
EU. Van den Belt (2003) analysed the precautionary principle and argued that proving absolute 
safety in innovations is a logically impossible task. According to Van den Belt, the proponents of 
precautionary principle consider ‗sound science‘ is represented by ‗fully quantified risk 
assessment‘ which proves no possible harm from an innovation. In the case of GMOs, however, 
where indirect, cumulative effects are possible, fully quantified risk assessment is an unattainable 
task. In other words, proving a negative is impossible. It is also interesting to see that the EU 
acknowledge that zero risk is not possible. 
“The measures envisaged must make it possible to achieve the appropriate level of 
protection. Measures based on the precautionary principle must not be 
disproportionate to the desired level of protection and must not aim at zero risk, 
something which rarely exists” (European Commission, 2000).  
 
In the case of CDC Triffid, however, the EU expects to have no possible risk or zero risk by 
maintaining a zero tolerance policy, which is an unattainable objective.  It is apparent that the 
precautionary principle, which is the basis of zero tolerance policy, is linked with a number of 
other factors which give very vague definitions in different situations. Section 2.5 focuses on 
some of the factors influencing zero tolerance policy other than scientific risk.  
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2.5 Factors other than scientific risk behind the EU’s GMO policy  
The insignificant area under GM crops in the EU indicates that the process of approving such 
crops in the EU is politicised. This has made the regulations very complex. According to Backus 
et al. (2008) the slower rate of cultivation of GM crops in the EU, as compared to other 
countries, is due to consumer resistance to GMOs and the lengthy procedure of the EU for 
approving new GM crops. The draft Commission Decision authorising the placing on the market 
of products containing, consisting of, or produced from genetically modified maize MON89034 
clearly shows how other factors outweigh science in authorising GM crops in the EU (EC, 
2010e). Even after EFSA gave a favourable opinion, Member States did not support the decision 
based on the following reasons: 
 the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) opinion was not considered as fully 
satisfactory; 
 the precautionary principle was invoked; 
 the negative public opinion with respect to GMO;and 
 political reasons (EC, 2010e). 
 
This shows that science is a criteria the EU uses when determining the market access for GM 
crops, but it is not the only criteria. Therefore, scientific evidence does not guarantee market 
access into the EU for any particular GM crop if the other reasons mentioned above are more 
influential.  
Tiberghien (2009) has explained the reasons behind the highly restrictive regulatory position of 
the EU in adopting GMOs. The author advances a framework of competitive governance in the 
EU. This competitive governance leads to disagreements in legitimacy and agenda setting 
between the Commission and the Council of Ministers on highly controversial issues.  In the case 
of GMOs, the multi-level nature of EU governance creates a challenge of legitimacy. This was 
clearly highlighted in the speech titled ―GMOs: Letting the Voice of Science Speak‖ given at a 
Policy Dialogue at European Policy Centre in Brussels on October 15, 2009. The speaker was 
Mariann Fischer Boel, a Member of the European Commission responsible for Agriculture and 
Rural Development.  
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―Month after month, GMOs receive a clean bill of health from EFSA, but then get 
stuck because Member States cannot reach any qualified majority, in favour or 
against, when it comes to the vote on a proposal for authorisation. So first the relevant 
committee decides nothing; then the Council decides nothing; and finally, the 
Commission grants authorisation, as laid down in the rules. This process swallows 
huge amounts of time. That would be quite legitimate – necessary, in fact – if new 
scientific information was being put on the table. But in the vast majority of cases, this 
is not what's happening‖ (Europa, 2009). 
 
Therefore, the perceived gap between policy decisions and the low level of trust toward available 
scientific information on food safety have led to more restrictive regulation on GMOs in the EU. 
Another possible explanation given by Jackson and Anderson (2005) is that the EU is giving EU 
biotechnology firms time to catch up with American competitors so that intellectual property 
rights will be paid to domestic rather than foreign patent holders. Further, they suggest that the 
EU moratorium on GM imports helps the EU farmers even though it negates the productivity 
they could receive from the new GM biotechnology. Both arguments can be considered as 
examples of pure economic protectionism. 
According to Prévost (2010), the EU regulators are faced with pressure from lobby groups who 
represent agricultural interest that are becoming less competitive in agriculture due to progress in 
trade liberalisation. The author argues that when the Agreement on Agriculture was signed in 
1995 at the Uruguay Round Negotiations, the protected agriculture sector of the EU was exposed 
to liberalisation. The Agreement on Agriculture was aimed at dismantling the traditional 
protectionist measures such as tariffs, export subsidies and domestic supports which were the 
shields that protected domestic producers in the EU from competition. Therefore, the agricultural 
industry in the EU tends to seek protectionism in the form of non-tariff barriers such as SPS 
barriers (Prévost, 2010). This can be considered as a nefarious use of SPS measures to provide 
economic protectionism to producers. 
In the case of the GMO debate within the EU, a number of influential interest groups can be 
identified. Out of these groups, Friends of Earth Europe, Greenpeace and European Farmers 
Coordination have jointly lobbied various levels of the government to support the EU‘s zero 
tolerance policy.  They argue that the reason for food and feed prices reaching crisis levels in EU 
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in 2007-2008 was not an outcome of EU‘s ‗zero tolerance policy‘ on GMOs. They do not 
explain the possible reasons, but assumes that the rejected amounts of food and feed due to GM 
contaminations were too low to create a food and feed crisis in the EU (Friends of Earth Europe, 
2010a). Further, they have challenged European Commissions recent proposal to change 
legislation on GM food and feed. For example, 
“The European Commission is bowing to the scaremongering tactics of the biotech 
industry, and as a result, opening Europe’s markets to unauthorised GM food and 
feed. Europe’s laws on genetically modified foods are there for a reason – to protect 
the public and the environment. The right of the public to say no to GM foods and 
feeds must be respected. Member states should reject this proposal and maintain 
Europe's position on zero tolerance.” (Friends of Earth Europe, 2010b). 
According to Maginier et al. (2009), the EU‘s organic producers also strongly oppose the 
introduction of allowances for low level adventitious presence of unapproved GM crops in the 
agricultural supply chain. The main reason for the opposition is the increase in profits of these 
non-GM producers in the presence of trade restrictions on unapproved GM crops. 
As explained by Hobbs et al. (2004), the inability of consumers or downstream firms to detect 
the presence of GMOs leads to the problem of asymmetric information and uncertainty. In such 
situations, individuals may assign vastly different subjective probabilities to various outcomes. 
Similarly, consumer lack of awareness of whether there is any risk in CDC Triffid flax may also 
leads to the problem of asymmetric information and uncertainty. Hobbs et al. (2004) also 
emphasize the potential of consumer demanding for protectionism. This is particularly relevant 
in the case of CDC Triffid flax. Even though only fifteen to twenty percent of flaxseed imports 
of EU is destined for direct human consumption, consumer demand for protection from GM 
flaxseed can be considered as one of the reasons for imposing the trade restriction on Canadian 
flaxseed. It is apparent that consumer views, concerns and perceptions are very important in 
trade of any commodity. However in the case of CDC Triffid flax, absolute risk averseness of 
consumers is an irrational behaviour as CDC Triffid flax poses no significant threat to their 
health. 
Eurobarometer surveys measures the attitudes and perceptions of a representative sample of the 
adult population of each Member State of the EU. A survey conducted in 2005, shows that public 
trust is still lacking for allowing GMOs to be used in products destined for human consumption. 
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A majority of Europeans (58 percent) believe that the development of GM foods should not be 
encouraged (EC, 2008b). 
According to Josling and Roberts (2001), consumer resistance to GMOs in EU is linked to a 
scare surrounding the illegal use of diethylstilbestrol (DES) in veal production in France in 1970. 
DES was found in baby food made from veal, and cases of children born with birth defects due 
to exposure to DES were reported in EU. The DES scare in EU created a consumer suspicious of 
the harmful effects of certain food production practices. This suspicious surfaced in the wake of 
the outbreak of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE), the ban on the use of hormones in 
livestock production and, more recently, with the introduction of GMOs into the food chain.  
Decisions based on inaccurate testing methods are also used as a justification for trade restriction 
on Canadian flaxseed. Extremely sensitive testing methods lead to number of false positive test 
results along the supply chain. Based on inaccurate testing results, consumers tend to think that 
the comingling is widespread. This bias in testing has created increased suspicion among 
consumers and the costly initiatives for the flaxseed industry to deal with them. According to 
European Commission Joint Research Center (2009b), a company named Genetic ID NA, Inc 
developed the technique for detecting CDC Triffid i.e. the ‗NOS-spec. Construct Specific Real 
Time Polymerase Chain Reaction Method (PCR)‘. This method was then transferred to the 
Community Reference Laboratary for Food and Feed (CRL-GMFF) of the European 
Commission Joint Research Center by German authorities.  
According to Gryson et al. (2007), PCR method is well known for its high sensitivity and 
specificity, however acquisition of reliable results might be negatively influenced by the 
presence of PCR inhibitors and the deterioration of DNA through the processing of the product. 
According to Booker (2011), CDC Triffid contamination in breeder seed lots ranged between 2 
GM seeds per million and 6 seeds per hundred thousand. Due to this low level presence of GM 
seeds, the number of positive tests expected from a clean seed lot is indistinguishable from the 
potential rates of false positive tests. Also, as the seed lots are tested repeatedly along the supply 
chain, these errors will likely produce a substantial number of contradictory results with clean 
seed lots tending to be rejected. Based on the false positive rate of 0.006, Booker (2011) has 
estimated that 2.4% of clean seed lots will have at least one false positive test out of four and this 
probability expands considerably as the number of tests per lot increase.  
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According to above mentioned reasons, it is apparent that scientific reasons are not the only 
reasons behind EU‘s GMO policy. The SPS Agreement, however, expects Members to rely on 
science whenever they use SPS measures. Therefore, it is important to understand how the 
precautionary principle is treated in the context of WTO rulings. Moreover, it is also important to 
analyse whether the EU met its commitment in the SPS Agreement in the case of the CDC 
Triffid flax event. This question is the focus of section 2.6. 
 
2.6 The Precautionary principle and WTO rulings 
According to Kogan (2006), the decision of WTO panel on EC Biotech Products (DS 292) is 
especially significant for its discussion of the Precautionary Principle‘s legal status. The WTO 
Panel‘s decision on Biotechnology Products makes clear that in the absence of relevant 
international standards, WTO members should conduct a scientific risk assessment. Furthermore, 
the Panel determined that the phrase ‗insufficient scientific evidence‘ of Article 5.7 does not 
permit WTO members to override the SPS Article 5.1 which requires an adequate science based 
risk assessment (Kogan, 2006; Zarrilli, 2005). 
 
The WTO Appellate Body in Japan - Agricultural Products (DS 76),
24
 identified four 
requirements for provisional measures under Article 5.7.  
The measure must:  
(1) be imposed in respect of a situation where “relevant scientific information is 
insufficient”; 
(2) be adopted “on the basis of available pertinent information”; 
(3) not be maintained unless the Member seeks to “obtain the additional information 
necessary or a more objective assessment of risk”; and 
(4) be reviewed accordingly “within a reasonable period of time”. 
 
                                                          
24 Japan bans the importation of eight agricultural products;  apples, cherries, walnuts, apricots, pears, plums and 
quince originating from the United States on the ground that they are potential hosts of codling moth, a pest of 
quarantine significance to Japan (WTO, 1999). The ban was in place from the early 1970s to 2001. In 2001 Japan 
and the US found a mutually acceptable solution.  
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According to the Panel, these four requirements are clearly cumulative in nature and whenever 
one of these four requirements is not met, the measure at issue is inconsistent with Article 5.7 
(WTO, 1999). The Panel found that Japan had not fulfilled the requirements contained in the 
second and third sentences of Article 5.7 and, therefore, the trade restriction was inconsistent 
with the Article 5.7 of the SPS Agreement. 
 
In the case of Japan’s Apples (DS 245)25, the Appellate Body found that the measure was not a 
provisional measure as explained under Art. 5.7, as the measure was not imposed in respect of a 
situation "where relevant scientific evidence is insufficient". The Appellate Body found that the 
available scientific evidence in this case was enough to evaluate the likelihood of entry, 
establishment or spread of fire blight in Japan through apples exported from the United States 
(WTO, 2010d). As explained by Zarrilli (2005), the Appellate Body clarified that ‗insufficiency 
in scientific evidence‘ is not similar to ‗scientific uncertainty‘. 
 
According to FAO and WHO (1997), a Member's food safety measures are considered justified 
and in accordance with the provisions of the SPS Agreement if they are based on Codex 
standards and related texts. Even though the adoption and application of Codex standards 
remains technically non-mandatory, failure to apply Codex standards creates the potential for 
dispute. The Codex Alimentarius Commission (2009) introduced the guidelines for the risk 
analysis of foods derived from modern biotechnology. Annex Three of this guideline describes 
the recommended approach to the food safety assessment in situations of low-level presence of r-
DNA plant material in food (ICTSD, 2008). The recommended approach is valid for the situation 
of asynchronous authorisation; i.e. importing country has not done any food safety assessment of 
the relevant GMOs but exporting country has done the food safety assessment according to the 
‗Guidelines for the conduct of food safety assessment of foods derived from recombinant-DNA 
Plants’ (CAC/GL 45-2003) of Codex (2003). As CDC Triffid flax is an authorised crop in 
Canada (CFIA, 2010), but not authorised in EU, this guideline is applicable for the low level 
presence of CDC Triffid in Canadian flaxseed shipments to EU. However, a controversy may 
                                                          
25 In 2002, the US complained at WTO that Japan violates SPS Agreement by restricting imports of apples from the 
US due to concerns about the risk of transmission of fire blight bacterium (WTO, 2010d). In 2005, both parties 
reached a mutually agreed solution.  
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arise regarding when the food safety assessment was done for CDC Triffid. According to Health 
Canada the food safety assessment of CDC Triffid was done in 1999 according to its Guidelines 
for the Safety Assessment of Novel Foods (Health Canada, 1999). However, as following the 
Codex guidelines in risk assessment is not mandatory the EU could still do their own risk 
assessment. Figure 2.1 summarises the risk analysis process in situations of low-level presence 
of recombinant-DNA plant material in food as explained in Codex Alimentarius Commission 
(2009).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Modified from Codex Alimentarius Commission, 2009) 
Figure 2.1 Risk analyses in situations of low-level presence of recombinant-DNA plant 
material in food according to Codex guidelines 
 
Risk assessment 
Based on  
 
Principles for the risk analysis of 
foods derived from modern 
biotechnology (CAC/GL 44-2003)  
 
Guidelines for the conduct of food 
safety assessment of foods derived 
from recombinant-DNA plants 
(CAC/GL 45-2003)  
 
Annex 3 of Codex (2009) Food safety 
assessment in situations of low-level 
presence of recombinant-DNA plant 
material in food  
Risk management 
 
Risk management principles of 
(CAC/GL 44-2003) are applied. 
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appropriate. 
 
Countries can decide when and 
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context of their regulatory systems. 
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government, industry, academia, 
media and consumers. 
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As shown in Figure 2.1, risk assessment is an integrated part of the risk analysis process. In the 
case of CDC Triffid flax, the risk assessment can be defined as the evaluation of the potential for 
adverse effects on human or animal health arising from the presence of CDC Triffid flax in food, 
or feedstuffs. If the EU considered the risk assessment done by Health Canada as valid scientific 
information they would be able to allow a threshold of 0.9 percent for the adventitious or 
technically unavoidable presence of CDC Triffid flax in imports of Canadian flaxseed. However, 
even if the EU conducted a risk assessment of their own, setting the same threshold would be the 
possible science based decision as CDC Triffid posed no risk to human, animal or plant health or 
life. (0.9 percent is the present threshold in EU for adventitious presence of approved GMOs in 
non-GM food to be classified as non-GM). Instead, the EU requires the zero presence of CDC 
Triffid in conventional flaxseed based on precaution because the EU assumes there is theoretical 
uncertainty in possible risk associated with CDC Triffid. However, it is a violation of SPS 
Agreement by the EU.  
 
2.6.1 Violation of SPS Agreement by the EU in the case of CDC Triffid  
Article 5.1 and 5.7 are related to the risk assessment and the EU is in violation of both in the case 
of CDC Triffid flax. Article 5.1 states: “Members shall ensure that their sanitary or 
phytosanitary measures are based on an assessment, as appropriate to the circumstances, of the 
risks to human, animal or plant life or health, taking into account risk assessment techniques 
developed by the relevant international organisations”. 
The EU did not conduct any risk assessment of CDC Triffid flax based on the risk assessment 
techniques introduced by Codex Alimentarius Commission in 2009 in the case of low level 
presence of GMOs in food chain and therefore is in violation of Article 5.1 of the SPS 
Agreement. 
Furthermore, the EU is in violation of Article 5.7 which is the precautionary principle of the SPS 
Agreement. According Article 5.7, an SPS measure is valid if four cumulative requirements are 
met. However, in the case of CDC Triffid, the EU has not met requirements one, three and four 
of the Article 5.7, the EU is not able to justify its zero tolerance for CDC Triffid based on 
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‗relevant insufficiency of scientific information‘ because there is enough scientific information 
available in Canada which was used in giving approval to CDC Triffid flax. Further, SPS 
measure should not be maintained unless the Member seeks to ―obtain the additional information 
necessary or a more objective assessment of risk‖; and measure should be reviewed accordingly 
―within a reasonable period of time‖. Nearly 17 months passed after the EU‘s trade restriction on 
Canadian flax and there is no evidence that the EU is seeking additional information on CDC 
Triffd flax or conducting a risk assessment on CDC Triffid flax. Seventeen months can be 
considered as reasonable period of time to initiate a review of trade restriction on CDC Triffid. 
However, the EU has failed to meet these requirements of Article 5.7 of SPS. Figure 2.2 
illustrates the EU‘s violation of Article 5.7 and 5.1 in the case of CDC Triffid flax. EU did not 
conduct any specific risk assessment of CDC Triffid flax but merely used its blanket application 
of zero tolerance on unapproved GMO‘s to restrict flax imports from Canada. In this case, the 
EU justifies its zero tolerance policy on scientific uncertainty related to CDC Triffid flax. 
However, as explained in Section 2.5, there are number of other non scientific and more 
influential factors behind the EU‘s GMO policy which support the hindering of imports of 
GMOs into the EU. 
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Source: Modified from WTO (1999) 
Figure 2.2 Violation of SPS Agreement by the EU 
Risk assessment of CDC Triffid flax 
 identify the adverse effects on human and animal health (if any) arising from the presence of 
the Triffid flax in food or animal feed, and 
 if any such adverse effect exists, evaluate the potential or probability of occurrence of these 
effects 
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2.7 Conclusion 
Global land area under GM crops is increasing rapidly. Canada was the fifth largest GM crop 
growing country in 2008. In contrast, the EU has comparatively little land under GM crop 
cultivation. Similar to the difference in acreage under GM crops, a significant difference in 
regulations and perspectives can be seen when comparing GMO policy between the EU and 
Canada. The EU‘s ‗zero tolerance policy‘ on adventitious presence of CDC Triffid flax in 
Canadian flaxseed exported to the EU is the latest example. The EU‘s zero tolerance policy is 
based on precaution, which is a controversial concept. According to SPS Agreement of the WTO 
(to which the EU is a member), the precautionary approach should be based on a scientific 
evidence and risk assessment. In the case of CDC Triffid flax, however, the EU did not consider 
the available scientific information and did not conducted any risk assessment of CDC Triffid 
flax, instead it merely applied its blanket application of zero tolerance. The EU did not consider 
the possibility of following the guidelines given in Codex Almentarius Commission in the case 
of CDC Triffid flax. Therefore, the EU is in violation of Article 5.1 and 5.7 of SPS Agreement. 
In other words, the EU has abandoned the science based regulation of trade despite its 
acceptance of SPS obligations. In reality, there are more influential reasons than the scientific 
information which led the EU to restrict the import of CDC Triffid contaminated Canadian 
flaxseed. However, the EU can still claim its zero tolerance policy on CDC Triffid flax is based 
on ‗sound science‘ due to the inconclusive nature of the application of science in SPS 
Agreement. A Dispute Panel would have to be requested to resolve the issue. 
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Chapter 3 : Market closure of EU to Canadian flax seed 
 
3.1 Introduction 
As explained in the introductory chapter, on September 8th, 2009 the European Commission 
issued a Rapid Alert notification confirming the presence of CDC Triffid flax in some samples of 
flaxseed imports from Canada. In September 2009, the Canadian Grain Commission (CGC) also 
confirmed a trace amount of GM material was present in some Canadian flaxseed shipments. 
This led to a closure of the EU market to Canadian flaxseed. 
There are currently no varieties of GM flaxseed registered in Canada. FP967, a GM flaxseed 
variety commonly known as CDC Triffid, received regulatory feed and environmental safety 
authorisations in 1996, and food safety authorisations in 1999, but was never released for 
commercial production (Flax Council of Canada, 2009a). According to Booker (2011), before 
the deregistration approximately 5000 ha of CDC Triffid was grown by Canadian seed growers 
across Western Canada and approximately 5500 tonnes of CDC Triffid seed were collected and 
crushed during the recall in 2001. According to Statistics Canada (2010d), the distribution of the 
positive samples in the wake of the discovery of CDC Triffid in the EU in 2009 was widespread 
in western Canada, making it harder to pin point a source of contamination. In April 2009, two 
5000 tonne shipments of flax exported to Europe from Canada were found to be contaminated 
with GM flax when they arrived in port in the EU (Booker, 2011). By September 2009, the GM 
flax in the EU was confirmed as being the CDC Triffid variety. At a meeting of the Standing 
Committee on the Food Chain and Animal Health of European Commission, held in Brussels on 
16 November 2009, Member States agreed that the approach to deal with CDC Triffid flax 
should be similar to the one followed by the Committee with respect to the control of food 
containing the unauthorised GM rice LL601 (EC, 2009b). Furthermore, the Standing Committee 
decided that illegal flaxseed should not be allowed to enter the EU market or further distributed 
in the food and feed supply chain. Stored bulk shipments of flaxseed imported before the 
Protocol had to be tested and, in case of unfavourable results, be withdrawn from the market. 
Member States must continue notifying unfavourable results relevant for products that may have 
been dispatched to other Member States. The notification should be communicated using the 
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RASFF (EC, 2009b). It is interesting to note that when comingling of GM rice LL601 was 
identified in the EU it was not an authorised crop in its originating country, the US.  
 
3.2 Protocol developed by Canada and EU 
In order to have a procedure for having Canadian flaxseed acceptable for import into the EU 
market a Protocol was developed by Canadian Grain Commission in consultation with the Flax 
Council of Canada, and DG SANCO
26
 of the European Commission. Agriculture and Agri-food 
Canada, Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada and the Canadian Food Inspection 
Agency were also involved in the development of the Protocol (CGC, 2010b). The Protocol 
establishes a system of sampling, testing, and documentation pertaining to the presence of CDC 
Triffid in the supply chain of Canadian flaxseed destined for the EU. The Protocol satisfies the 
EU zero tolerance policy for unauthorised GMOs.  The level of detection of CDC Triffid is at 
0.01percent level, i.e one GM seed in 10 000 seeds. 
The Government of Canada proposed this sampling, testing and certification protocol to the 
European Commission and EU Member States on October 19, 2009. The European Commission 
advised Canada on October 29, 2009, that Member States had consented to the Commissions‘ 
approval of the Canadian protocol. However, this original protocol created unacceptable 
commercial risk for Canadian flax shippers and the EU officials. The reason was that the vessels 
started sailing prior to final test results being available. That resulted in arriving of positive 
cargoes in the EU. In March 2010, a revision was made to the original protocol. The revision 
included a ―pre-load‖ test that allowed for final results of CGC testing to be known prior to 
loading the ocean vessel. Pre-load testing enables the diversion of stocks that tested positive 
away from the EU market. This Protocol is not considered as an official legal agreement, but is 
an industry commitment backed by an official CGC Letter of Analysis.  
 
                                                          
26
 DG SANCO is the French acronym for the ‗Directorate-General sante‘ et protection des consommateurs‘  - 
Directorate-General for Health and Consumer Affairs. It is an administrative unit of European Commission and has 
three sections; Public Health, Food Safety and Consumer Affairs (Kirch, 2008). 
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Sampling 
According to the revised Protocol, three samples of flaxseed must be collected as flaxseed moves 
through the Canadian supply chain.  
―First, a sample will be taken by grain handling company personnel from each 
producer delivery into the commercial handling system. This sample will be retained 
for a period of no less than six months from the date of delivery. Generally, flaxseed 
moves from primary elevators to port position by railcar. Therefore, a second sample 
will be taken at the time of loading onto the railcar. Each railcar will be sampled, and 
composite samples representing not more than 5 railcars will be prepared. A third 
sample will be taken of flaxseed destined for the EU by CGC personnel at the time 
railcars are unloading flaxseed at the terminal (i.e. port) elevators. The CGC provides 
guidance on sampling methods to the Canadian grain industry in its official Sampling 
Systems Handbook and Approval Guide” (CGC, 2009b).  
Testing 
Testing will be undertaken for the second and third samples.  
 ―Grain handling companies will test composite rail car samples for the presence of 
FP967. If a composite sample tests positive for the presence of FP967, all railcars 
testing positive from which the aggregated sample was taken will be removed from the 
EU flaxseed supply chain. When rail cars arrive at port terminals, prior to railcar 
unloading, the CGC will seal all silos
27
 in the elevator containing flaxseed not tested 
under this Protocol or that has tested positive and record the silo and seal numbers. 
Then the CGC will obtain a list of silos in the elevator designated for negative 
flaxseed destined to the EU and confirm those silos are empty prior to use. The CGC 
will then obtain a list of railcars that have tested negative from the grain handling 
companies and monitor grain flow from each railcar unload to each designated silo. 
Then CGC will prepare two 2.5 kilogram samples for each silo. One sample will be 
forwarded to an ISO 17025 accredited laboratory. The CGC will notify terminal 
                                                          
27
 Silo is a cylindrical structure used for bulk storage of grain in grain elevators. 
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elevator operators of the testing results for each silo. Any silo for which the composite 
sample tests positive will be removed from the EU flaxseed supply chain” (CGC, 
2010a).  
For shipments that are CDC Triffid-free, the CGC will prepare an official Letter of Analysis to 
accompany the product along with other quality certifications.  
Testing Laboratories 
Laboratories to conduct the above mentioned testing can only be designated as qualified if they 
operate and have been assessed in accordance with the ISO 17025 standard on ‗General 
requirements for competence and testing and calibration laboratories‘ and if the proposed test 
method falls within the scope of the above assessment (CGC, 2010a). These Laboratories will 
employ the construct-specific method developed by a company named Genetic ID, and verified 
by the European Community Reference Laboratory, to detect CDC Triffid (European 
Commission Joint Research Center, 2009a). 
Commercial segregation and quality management  
The Protocol does not include any procedure to segregate positive and negative flaxseed lots. 
However, it assumes that all Canadian grain handling companies exporting bulk flaxseed to the 
EU are either ISO or HACCP certified and, therefore, they will employ internal quality 
management systems and practices to guard against cross contamination of flaxseed testing 
positively and flaxseed lots testing negatively (CGC, 2010a). 
 
3.3 Other market closures for Canadian GM flax 
Brazil has ‗zero tolerance‘ for unapproved GM products. According to the Flax Council of 
Canada (2010d), as of November 4, 2009 the Government of Brazil announced the mandatory 
holding and testing of all flax shipments entering Brazil from Canada. If the tests prove negative, 
the flaxseed can enter Brazil. Several Canadian flaxseed containers have tested positive for CDC 
Triffid and these shipments have been halted at the border by Brazilian Ministry of Agriculture 
officials.  
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After the GM flax event in the EU, Japan‘s Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries 
requested that Canada‘s flaxseed industry implement appropriate preventive measures. Canadian 
Government has developed a Protocol to describe the system of sampling, testing, and 
documentation pertaining to the presence CDC Triffid in bulk vessel shipments of Canadian 
flaxseed to Japan. This protocol is specific to bulk shipments of flaxseed destined for industrial 
or feed use, and incorporates an allowable tolerance of one percent for CDC Triffid (CGC, 
2010d). Japan imports Canadian flaxseed mainly for industrial purposes. 
 
3.4 Changes in flaxseed exports after the CDC Triffid event  
There were no exports of Canadian flaxseed to the EU in first three months after the detection of 
CDC Triffid flax, i.e September, October and November, 2009. However, in 2008 Canada 
exported 150 400 tonnes of flaxseed to EU during these three months. The decline in the export 
of Canadian flaxseed to EU in 2009/2010 was approximately 35 percent relative to the eight year 
average exports (CGC, 2000-2010, Statistics Canada, 2010f)). With the introduction of the 
Protocol in October, exports to the EU resumed in December 2009. 
Source: Canadian Grain Commission (2000-2010) 
 Figure 3.1: Changes in flaxseed exports over the time 
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It is interesting to observe that there is sudden increase of export to China after the CDC Triffid 
event – see Figure 3.1. There were no exports to China in 2008; however, since November 2009 
China has become a major importer of Canadian flaxseed. Exports to US increased somewhat 
after the CDC Triffid event. Exports to the EU on the other hand are lower than levels prior to 
the CDC Triffid event. Section 3.5 gives a theoretical explanation of the impact of the EU‘s zero 
tolerance policy on the flaxseed industry and linseed oil industry. 
 
3.5 Theoretical explanation of the impact of the EU’s zero tolerance policy on 
flaxseed industry and linseed oil industry 
Figure 3.2 illustrates the changes in world flaxseed markets after the CDC Triffid event. This 
model is developed based on a model from Issac et al. (2002). Before the CDC Triffid event all 
the countries that consumed flaxseed were assumed to be CDC Triffid free. In Canada, supply is 
depicted by SCa. At any price above the point where SCa intersects the domestic demand curve 
DCa, Canada will have product surplus to domestic demand that is available for export. At any 
price above this domestic equilibrium price, the quantity of flaxseed available for export is the 
horizontal distance between SCa and DCa. The Canadian export supply of flaxseed is shown as ST1 
in the international market.  
Before the CDC Triffid event, the EU was the main importer of Canadian flaxseed. In the EU, at 
any price below the intersection of the domestic supply curve, SEU, and the domestic demand 
curve, DEU1, customers – largely industrial users of linseed - will be willing to purchase a greater 
quantity of flaxseed than domestic producers are willing to supply. Flaxseed imports from 
Canada are used to make up this shortfall. China was a minor importer of Canadian flaxseed 
before the CDC Triffid event. Similar to the EU, in China, at any price below the intersection of 
the domestic supply curve, SCH, and the domestic demand curve, DCH1, customers will be willing 
to purchase a greater quantity of flaxseed than domestic producers are willing to supply. For 
simplicity, other importers of Canadian flaxseed are not considered here. Therefore, flaxseed 
imports of the EU and China at different prices are depicted by the import demand function, DT1, 
in the international market. Prior to the discovery of CDC Triffid flax in the EU, the quantity 
traded was the determined by the equilibrium price Pw1 in the international market. At PW1, 
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Canada exported QB- QA of flaxseed and the EU imported QD- QC and China imported quantity 
QF-QE. Total import demand at PW1 in the international market was Q1. 
When CDC Triffid flax was discovered, the effective demand for Canadian flaxseed in the EU 
decreased from DEU1 to DEU2 due to high regulatory costs. The decreased demand in the EU leads 
to decreased price and decreased demand of flaxseed in the international market. Due to this low 
price, the Chinese quantity demanded of Canadian flaxseed increased and eventually, the 
international market demand for Canadian flaxseed declined to DT2. At international market 
demand DT2, equilibrium price became PW2
28
.  At the price of PW2, Chinese imports of Canadian 
flax became QJ – QI. At PW2 Canadian exports decreased to QH – QG. Amount of flaxseed traded 
at international market decreased to Q2 (See Figure 3.2). 
                                                          
28
 After the CDC Triffid incident, Chinese and the EU markets for Canadian flaxseed became two heterogeneous 
markets. The international market demand (DT2) in Figure 3.2, represents the short run flaxseed demand of China. 
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Figure 3.2: Changes in flaxseed market after the Triffid event 
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According to UNcomtrade (2010) linseed oil export from China doubled in 2009 compared to 
average linseed oil exports of previous five years. In addition, linseed oil export of US increased 
by 10 percent in 2009 compared to the previous four year average exports. Figure 3.3 illustrates 
the changes in linseed oil market after the CDC Triffid event. Before the CDC Triffid event the 
supply of linseed oil in the international market (ST1) was dominated by flaxseed oil exported 
from the EU. The contribution of the US and China was marginal and ST2 represent the total 
supply of linseed oil from the EU, the US and China. In the EU, supply is depicted by SEU1. At 
any price above the point where SEU1 intersects the domestic demand curve DEU, the EU will 
have product surplus to domestic demand that is available for export. At any price above this 
domestic equilibrium price, the quantity of linseed oil available for export is the horizontal 
distance between SEU1 and DEU. Similarly, linseed oil available for export in China is the 
horizontal distance between SCH and DCH and linseed oil available for export in US is the  
horizontal distance between SUS and DUS. The equilibrium amount of linseed oil traded at 
international market was Q1 and equilibrium price was PW1 (See Figure 3.3). 
Once Canadian flaxseed imports to the EU decreased due to the CDC Triffid event, the linseed 
oil supply of the EU decreased to SEU2.  The decrease in the EU linseed oil exports was QA-QB. 
The EU‘s supply of linseed oil to international market declined from ST1 to ST3. Due to reduction 
in supply the price of linseed oil in the international market increased. Due to high price China 
increased its supply of linseed oil by quantity QD-QC and US increased its supply by quantity QF-
QE . This leads to an increase of linseed supply for the international market of ST4. At the supply 
of ST4 equilibrium price of international market became PW2. 
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Figure 3.3: Changes in linseed oil market after the Triffid event 
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Due to the CDC Triffid event market share of EU in the world linseed oil market decreased 
while the market share of US and China increased. It is also interesting to note that both the US 
and China use GM comingled flaxseed of Canada to produce linseed oil while the EU use GM 
free flaxseed to produce linseed oil. As GM free flaxseed comes to the EU with a risk premium, 
the cost of production of linseed oil in the EU is higher than it is in the US and China. Therefore, 
other than the decreased market share, the EU has lost its competitiveness in the linseed oil 
market due to the CDC Triffid event.  
3.6 Conclusion 
With the detection of CDC Triffid flax in the EU, flaxseed exports from Canada to the EU 
declined drastically. In order to have a procedure for having Canadian flaxseed acceptable for 
import into the EU market a Protocol was developed. After the introduction of the Protocol, 
flaxseed exports to the EU increased gradually but did not return to the level prior to the CDC 
Triffid incident. In contrast flaxseed export from Canada to China increased significantly after 
the CDC Triffid incident. The reduced flaxseed imports of the EU from Canada resulted in lower 
linseed oil exports from EU. However, the supply of linseed oil from China and the US increased 
because they were able to import more flaxseed from Canada at the lower price. The 
international markets for flaxseed and linseed oil are, however, still adjusting to the CDC Triffid 
incident market shocks. In what follows, the short run costs associated with the CDC Triffid 
event are investigated. A model of the flaxseed supply chain is first developed and then the short 
run costs associated with the CDC Triffid event are attributed to the various actors along the 
supply chain.  
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Chapter 4 : Overview of Flaxseed Industry  
 
4.1 Introduction  
Flax is an ancient crop. Wall paintings depicting flax cultivation, and cloth made of flax fibre 
were found in some of the oldest burial chambers of the Egyptians, dating from around 3000 B.C 
(Erasmus, 1986). For centuries, people around the world have been using the flax plant for food, 
animal feed, medicine and fibre. The history of flax in Canada dates back almost 400 years to 
1617 when Louis Hébert, thought to be the first farmer in Canada, cultivated flax in ‗New 
France‘. By 1875, European settlers were seeding the newly broken western prairie with flax 
brought from their homelands (Flax Council of Canada, 2009b). Flax flourished in the rich soils 
of the prairies and by the 1990‘s the Canadian provinces of Alberta, Manitoba and Saskatchewan 
collectively became the world leader in flaxseed production.  
 
4.2 Uses of flaxseed 
Industrial applications  
The main use of Canadian produced flaxseed is for the production of linseed oil. Linseed oil is an 
input into a number of industrial products including: linoleum, oilcloths, paints, resins, inks, 
varnishes and other coatings (Berglund, 2002). Linoleum is a flooring that is manufactured by 
oxidising linseed oil to form a thick mixture called linoleum cement. The cement is cooled and 
mixed with pine resin, and wood flour
29
 to form sheets on a jute backing. Linoleum contains 
approximately 30 percent linseed oil (Flax Council of Canada, 2010c). The drying quality of 
flaxseed oil
30
 is useful for these industrial applications (Rowland et al, 1995). One of the main 
demands for Canadian flaxseed is for manufacturing linoleum. 
                                                          
29 Wood flour is made out of ground-up timber. 
30 The drying quality of flaxseed oil is due to alpha linolenic acid which contains 3 double bonds that are easily 
oxidised and with enough heat polymerise to form a translucent film (Marian and Morris, 2003). 
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Nutritional qualities of flax used for human consumption 
 Flaxseeds contain 45 percent oil, 22 percent protein, 12 percent fibre, 10 percent mucilage
31
, 4 
percent minerals and 7 percent water (Erasmus, 1986). The uniqueness of flax seed oil is due to 
its richness in essential fatty acids. Flax seed oil contains 57 percent of the omega-3 fatty acid, 
unsaturated alpha-linolenic acid (ALA) which is said to be helpful in reducing the risk of 
cardiovascular diseases and cancers (Morris, 2003).  Flax seed also contains soluble and 
insoluble fibre. Soluble fibre helps lower blood cholesterol levels, while insoluble fibre assists in 
bowel movements. Lignans in flax are said to be helpful in protecting against certain kinds of 
cancer, particularly cancers of the breast and colon, by blocking tumour formation (Morris, 
2003). As a result of these findings of health-promoting or disease-prevention properties of flax 
seed, it is becoming a popular functional food
32
.  
 
As explained by Jalla (2010), the direct use of unprocessed conventional flax oil in the human 
diet is limited by product stability. Linseed oil with high ALA is highly susceptible to 
oxidation
33
. Therefore, flax is mainly used in milled or whole seed form in food recipes. There is 
a new flaxseed variety named Solin, which contains less than 5 percent linolenic acid compare to 
conventional flaxseed. Soiln is used to produce polyunsaturated edible oil similar to sunflower 
oil. It has yellow seeds whereas other verities of flax have brown seeds (Flax Council of Canada, 
2010d). 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
31
 Mucilage in flaxseed is a type of polysaccharide that becomes viscous when mixed with water or other fluids 
(Morris, 2003). 
 
32
 A functional food is similar in appearance to, or may be, a conventional food, is consumed as part of a usual diet, 
and is demonstrated to have physiological benefits and/or reduce the risk of chronic disease beyond basic nutritional 
functions (Health Canada, 2002).  
33 Oxidisation leads to rancid flaxseed oil with an unpleasant odor with in few weeks. In general, rancid oils are 
considered as being carcinogenic. 
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Cosmetic products 
Flax seed mucilage is used for the treatment of skin inflammation. Its strong hydrating properties 
are used for skin moisturising purposes. Flaxseed oil is a popular ingredient of specialty soaps, 
lotions, shampoos and other cosmetic products (Koslowska et al., 2008). 
 
Nutritional animal feed 
The industrial process which produces linseed oil yields the by-product linseed meal. It is 
considered a premium protein feed, especially for ruminants. It is utilised in some dairy cow 
rations and can be a component of beef cow, calf, hog, sheep, goat and horse diets. As explained 
by Erasmus (1986), flax has been used since antiquity to maintain good health in animals 
including; correction of digestive disturbances (e.g. bloating in calves), to produce glossy coats, 
to correct respiratory infections, etc. Moreover, poultry, beef, pork, milk, milk products and eggs 
can all have enhanced omega-3 fatty acid levels through the addition of flax in any of its various 
forms to the diet of the source animal (SaskFlax, 2009a). As explained by Koslowska et al. 
(2008), adding flaxseed oil to poultry feed enriches omega-3 polyunsaturated fatty acid levels in 
eggs. 
 
4.3 Uses of flax fibre 
To date in Canadian flax industry, there is no significant commercial role for flax fibre. Farmers 
who grow flax for seed leave much of straw in the field to be burnt. However, as explained by 
Ulrich and Richards (2007) there is a potential market for fibre as well. According to Berglund 
(2002), in Europe there is considerable interest in the use of natural fibre in interior panels, 
visors, and other parts of automobiles and General Motors has Canadian flax fibre in the rear 
parcel shelf of selected models.  
 
The major fibre flax cultivating country in the world is China with 110000 ha in 2007. China 
imports 80 percent of long flax fibre produced in France and Belgium which is used to produce 
high quality linen fabric. Other major fibre flax cultivating countries are Russia, France, Belarus, 
Ukraine, Belgium and the Netherlands (Mackiewics-Talarcsyk et al, 2008). Long line fibre is 
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used in manufacturing high value linen products, while short staple fibre
34
 has been the waste 
from long line fibre and used for lower value products like blankets, mats, mattresses and carpets 
(Jalla, 2010). 
 
4.4 Flaxseed production of Canada 
Flax has been an important export crop for Canada. In the 2008/09 crop year Western Canada 
produced 861 000 MT of flaxseed (Statistics Canada, 2010b).  
Table 4.1: Comparison of flax and other main crops grown in Canada 
Crop Average 2003/04 to 2007/08 
 Area 
harvested 
(000’s ha) 
Yield  
(kg/ha) 
Production 
 (000’s MT) 
Export  
(000’s MT) 
All wheat 
(including 
Durum)  
8 971 2 420 21 570 16 019 
Barley 3 719 3 140 11 391   2 695 
Oats 1 455 2 580  3 735   2 042 
Corn 1 163 8 320  9 636      406 
Canola 5 260 1 600  8 506   4 743 
Dry peas 1 353 2 240 3 023   2 283 
Soybean 1 152 2 540  2 855   1 358 
Flax    658 1 180    777      596 
Lentils    625 1 250    798      630 
     
Source: Statistics Canada (2010b) 
Flax has become a popular crop in the normal cropping rotation of many farms in the prairies. 
The major oil seeds grown in Canada other than flax are canola, soybean and sunflower seeds. 
Figure 4.1 shows changes in flax seed production in Canada from 1980 to 2009. 
                                                          
34
 When flax fibre cut into 2.5 inch lengths or less then it is called short staple fibre (USDA, 2005). 
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Source: Statistics Canada (2010c) 
Figure 4.1: Flaxseed production of Canada from 1980 to 2009 
 
The highest production was in 1995 with 1.10 million tonnes while the lowest production was in 
1988 with 0.32 million tonnes. Saskatchewan is the single largest producer of flaxseed in Canada 
and in the 2008/2009 crop year the province produced 77 percent of the total Canadian flax crop. 
Manitoba is the second largest flax growing province while Alberta ranks third, see Table 4.2. 
According to the Canadian Grain Commission (2009a), New Brunswick, Nova Scotia and Prince 
Edward Island also contribute to flaxseed production. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0
200,000
400,000
600,000
800,000
1,000,000
1,200,000
1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008
TO
N
N
ES
 
61 
 
Table 4.2: Production of flax seed by province (‘000 tonnes) 
Year  Manitoba  Saskatchewan  Alberta  
Western Canada  
Total 
2000 205.7 469.9  17.8 693.4 
2001 199.4 495.3 20.3 715.0 
2002 214.6  444.5 20.3 697.4 
2003 195.6 533.4  25.4 754.4 
2004  132.1 355.6 29.2 516.9 
2005 147.3 881.4  53.3 1,082.0 
2006 193.0 759.5 36.3 988.8 
2007 105.4 511.8 16.3 633.5 
2008 161.3 666.8 33.0 861.1 
2009 193.0 708.7 28.4 930.1 
2010 81.3 454.7 34.3 570.3 
Source: Flax Council of Canada (2010e) 
Total flaxseed production in western Canada decreased by 38 percent from 2009 to 2010. 
According to the Saskatchewan Ministry of Agriculture (2010), flaxseed seeded area in 
Saskatchewan decreased by 25 percent from 2009 to 2010. The main reason for the decrease in 
seeded area and production may be the disrupted flaxseed market in the EU. Heavy rains and 
excess wet conditions during the 2010 growing season may also have had some effect on 
reducing seeded area and production
35
. 
 
4.5 World Flaxseed production 
Global flaxseed production was 2 410 000 metric tonnes in 2009/2010 (Statistics Canada, 
2010f). Canada represents about 40 percent of world flaxseed production while China, the US, 
Ethiopia and India, together account for 40 percent of world production. Figure 4.2 illustrates the 
changes in flaxseed production over time. 
                                                          
35
 According to Statistics Canada (2010h) producers in Saskatchewan, Manitoba and Alberta managed to plant only 
76 percent, 95 percent and 95 percent of the intended acres respectively in 2010 due to excess moisture conditions. 
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Source: FAO (2009) 
Figure 4.2: Major flaxseed producing countries 
 
The production of the US and India has a declining trend while Ethiopia and China exhibit an 
increasing trend. Even with considerable fluctuations, Canada has maintained its position as the 
global leader in flaxseed production throughout the first decade of the 21
st
 century. Canada is the 
largest exporter of flaxseed as well. Figure 4.3 shows the major flaxseed exporting countries in 
2008 and Figure 4.4 shows the major importing countries for 2007.  
 
 
Source: FAO (2009) 
Figure 4.3: Major flaxseed exporting countries, 2008 
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Some of the major producers use their production mainly for domestic consumption while 
countries like Belgium export much of what they import from other countries, mainly from 
Canada. Figure 4.4 shows that Belgium is the main importer of flaxseed in 2007 while Figure 4.3 
shows Belgium as the second largest exporter.  
 
 
Source: FAO (2009) 
Figure 4.4: Major flaxseed importing countries, 2007 
This largely reflects transhipment as Antwerp in Belgium is the major port of import for Western 
Europe. The main flaxseed oil crushing plants in the EU are located in Belgium and Germany. 
 
4.6 Flaxseed production in the European Union  
Within the EU, the main producers of flaxseed are the United Kingdom, France, Belgium and 
Germany (FAO, 2009). Figure 4.5 shows the changes in the flax seed production of those 
countries over time. In the EU, the volume of flaxseed processed by the operators for all uses is 
approximately around 500 000 to 600 000 tons per year. Around 80 percent of that is imported 
from Canada and the remaining volumes come either from Russia, Ukraine, the US or from EU 
production (COCERAL and FEDIOL, 2010). 
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Source: FAO (2009) 
Figure 4.5: Flaxseed production in the EU 
 
Figure 4.5 shows a sharp decline in flaxseed production in the EU. For example, German 
production in 2008 is approximately 40 percent of the production in 2000. As explained by 
Agriculture and Agri-food Canada (2007b), the EU has an expanding biofuel industry and 
biodiesel requires rapeseed as an input, not flaxseed. The relative price of rapeseed has risen, 
leading to a large switching out of flaxseed production in the EU. It has been predicted that 
flaxseed production in the EU will continue to decline and, as a result, import demand will be 
strong in future. 
 
4.7 Canadian export markets for flaxseed 
The EU has historically been the largest importer of Canadian flaxseed, most of which is crushed 
in Belgium and Germany to produce linseed oil. Only a small amount (less than 20 percent,) is 
sold to the food industry for human consumption. Canada exports flaxseed primarily in the form 
of unprocessed raw seeds.  In the 2008/2009 crop year, Canada exported 639 000 tonnes of 
flaxseed. If average export volumes from 2003/2004 to 2007/2008 are considered, major export 
destinations were Belgium
36
 (65%), the US (23%), China (4%) and Japan (2%) (Statistics 
                                                          
36
 These figures may be somewhat misleading as one of the major ports of import of all of northern Europe is 
Antwerp in Belgium. Thus, while flaxseed may enter Europe through Antwerp, it may not actually be destined for 
Belgium. 
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Canada, 2010b). In the Statistics Canada and Canadian Grain Commission data bases exports to 
Europe is divided as exports Western Europe and exports to Eastern Europe. In the case of 
flaxseed export, countries mention under Western Europe belongs to European Union. Therefore, 
flaxseed exports to Western Europe can be considered as exports to the EU. Table 4.3 shows the 
total exports of flaxseed in recent years. 
 
Table 4.3: Export of flaxseed by country of final destination (000’s MT)  
Country Average 
2003/04 to 
2007/08 
Total 
2007/08 
Total 
2008/09
r 
August to 
March 
2008/09
r 
August to 
March 
2009/10
p 
Belgium 395 413 416 291 152 
Germany 1.4 6.1 1.4 0.7 1.1 
Netherlands 0.6 1.5 0.8 0.3 0.5 
Spain 0.9 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.3 
Western Europe total 399.6 425 429.9 302.7 157 
Eastern Europe total 0.4 1.1 0.8 0.4 0.2 
Egypt 5.9 0 0.7 0.2 4.1 
Middle East total  6.6 1.3 2.5 1.1 9.8 
Morocco 0.3 0.4 0.5 0 0.2 
Africa total 0.9 1.7 1.7 0.8 0.9 
China 24.9 46.9 70.6 15.2 161.8 
Japan 16.1 10.6 7.9 5.4 29.6 
South Korea 0.2 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.3 
Asia total 41.5 58.4 79.8 21.3 192.7 
Oceania Total 1 2.9 1.1 1.1 0.1 
Colombia 1 1.5 1.9 1 0.4 
South America total 2.9 5.3 5 2.3 7.4 
Mexico 2.8 4.2 4.6 2.6 2.8 
Central America and 
Antilles total 
3.5 5.5 5.9 3.4 3.6 
US 139.3 182.5 111.7 84.1 115.3 
Total Exports 595.7 683.7 638.5 417.2 487 
r
 revised, 
p  
preliminary 
Source: Statistics Canada (2010b) 
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It is important to note that as exports to the EU have decreased, export to Asia, especially to 
China, increased dramatically from 2008 to 2009 as Canadian flax was forced to seek alternative 
markets. In 2009/2010, the EU only accepted 35 percent of total Canadian flaxseed exports. 
However, if 2000 to 2008 exports are examined, the EU accounted for 73 percent of Canadian 
flaxseed exports. See Table 4.4. 
 
Table 4.4: The share of the EU in Canadian flaxseed export markets (000’s MT) 
Year 
 
 
Total 
production 
 
Total 
exports 
 
Exports to 
EU 
 
% of  exports 
from total 
production 
% of exports 
to EU from 
total exports 
2000 693.4 582 471 81 84 
2001 715 581 504 87 81 
2002 697.4 531 468 88 76 
2003 754.4 562 462 82 74 
2004 516.9 415 315 76 80 
2005 1,082.00 440 355 81 41 
2006 988.8 579 466 80 59 
2007 633.5 545 415 76 86 
2008 861.1 638 430 67 74 
Average 771 552 421 80 73 
Source: CGC (2000- 2010) 
 
It is apparent that the export market is vital for Canadian flaxseed industry as 80 percent of the 
production is destined for export. Similarly, the EU is the main market for Canadian flaxseed as 
it accounts for most of the exports.  
 
Canada also exports flaxseed oil and flaxseed meal. See Table 4.5. From 2003/2004 to 
2007/2008 the main flaxseed oil importers were Japan (48%), the US (30%) and South Korea 
(13%) while the main flaxseed meal importer was the US (95%). 
 
67 
 
Table 4.5: Export of Linseed oil and meal by country of final destination (Tonnes) 
Country Average 
2003/04 
to 
2007/08 
Total 
2007/08 
Total 
2008/09
r
 
August to 
July 
2008/09
r
 
August 
to July 
2009/10
p
 
Linseed oil 
     Japan 5116 2088 2453 2453 558 
US 3192 3141 1746 1746 837 
Korea, south 1407 1902 734 734 5 
United Kingdom 350 193 105 105 44 
China 239 2451 2574 2574 2679 
Other countries 398 1635 247 247 54 
Total Exports 10702 11410 7859 7859 4177 
Linseed meal            
US 16684 8713 6108 6108 3353 
Belgium 820 4100 0 0 0 
Other countries 154 5 94 94 126 
Total Exports 17658 12818 6202 6202 3479 
(Source: Statistics Canada, 2010b) 
The linseed oil and meal exports have decreased around 50 percent in 2009/2010 compare to 
2008/2009. However, linseed oil exports to China increased slightly over that period of time.  
 
4.8 GM flax 
Rapid increase of global acreage of GM crops between 1996 and 2008 indicates that it has been 
the most rapidly adopted crop technology in recent history (James, 2008).  According to Brooks 
and Barfoot (2010), herbicide tolerant crops account for 65 percent, and insect resistant crops 
account for 35 percent of global plantings of GM crops. Stacked traits are also increasingly 
important feature of biotechnology crops, which means more than one trait is in one GM crop. 
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For example one stacked maize variety in the US was a triple stacks conferring resistance to two 
insect pests as well as being herbicide tolerant.  
 
CDC Triffid is a herbicide tolerant GM flax variety developed by the Crop Development Centre 
of the University of Saskatchewan in 1994.  CDC Triffid flax is tolerant to soil residues of 
herbicides such as triasulfuron and metsulfuron-methyl. These herbicides were used in western 
Canada to control broadleaf weeds in wheat and barley. Commercial formulations were Glean
TM 
, Ally
TM
, and Refine
TM
 which were produced by DuPont (McHughen, 2000). Residues of these 
sulfonylurea herbicides persisted in soil for several years after their use. Crop rotation was 
limited during this period of time as commercially unacceptable injury to many crops may occur 
including damage to flax. Only crops such as wheat, oats and barley can be grown in these soils 
in the season following application of these herbicides or the land must be summer-fallowed 
(CIFA, 1996).  
 
As explained by the CFIA (1996),  
“The development of CDC Triffid was based on recombinant DNA technology and 
Agrobacterium-mediated transformation. An altered acetolactate synthase ensyme 
(ALS) from Arabidopsis thaliana was integrated into the genomic DNA of flax to 
confer tolerance to chlorosulfuron. Two other genes were also inserted: one 
conferring resistance to kanamycin, the other coding for the ensyme nopaline 
synthase. Both of these traits were used to select successful transformants in vitro”.  
 
 
In 1996 the CFIA, authorised CDC Triffid for unconfined release into the environment and for 
use as livestock feed (CFIA, 1996). Health Canada conducted a comprehensive assessment of 
CDC Triffid according to its Guidelines for the Safety Assessment of Novel Foods-1994, and 
concluded that CDC Triffid flax does not raise concerns related to human food safety (Health 
Canada, 1994 and 1999). 
However, as explained in Chapter 1, CDC Triffid was deregistered by the CFIA in 2001, due to 
the fear of losing the main market for Canadian flax after the EU placed a moratorium on the 
import of GM crops. In 2009, adventitious presence of CDC Triffid was identified and the 
testing results have indicated that almost all positive results have been below the 0.1 percent 
level (Hall, 2010). This is a low level presence, representing 1 seed in 1000 seeds. 
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4.9 Conclusion 
Flax has been an important export crop for Canada. Saskatchewan is the single largest producer 
of flax seed in Canada and in the world. China is the second largest producer of flaxseed. The 
main use of Canadian produced flaxseed is for the production of linseed oil. The export market is 
vital for Canadian flaxseed as 80 percent of the production is exported. From 2000 to 2008, the 
EU accounted for 73 percent of Canadian flaxseed exports. However, in 2009/2010, the EU only 
provided a market for 35 percent of the total flaxseed exports of Canada. The main reason for 
this large decrease in imports by the EU was stemming from the presence of CDC Triffid in 
Canadian flaxseed exports. CDC Triffid was authorised for feed and environmental release and 
for human consumption in Canada. However, it was deregistered in 2001 by the CFIA. Through 
deregistration, the flaxseed industry of Canada attempted to escape from the negative impacts of 
the EU‘s moratorium on GMO imports. However, adventitious presence of CDC Triffid resulted 
in a considerable additional cost and changes in revenue to the industry in 2009/2010. The next 
chapter focuses on estimating those additional costs and changes in revenue associated with the 
CDC Triffid event.  
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Chapter 5 : Estimating Total Additional Cost and Changes 
in Revenue Associated with Adventitious Presence of GM 
Flax in Flaxseed Supply Chain 
 
5.1 Introduction 
Prior to identifying GM flax in the supply chain, the main importer of Canadian flaxseed was the 
European Union. After the incident, exports to EU were reduced significantly. To keep this 
important market accessible to Canadian flax, the actors along the Canadian flax supply chain 
are expected to follow the Protocol related to flax importation developed by Canada and the EU. 
As the EU has ‗zero tolerance‘ for unauthorised GMO‘s, the Protocol requires a number of tests 
to detect the possible presence of GM flax along the supply chain. Further, the potential for the 
comingling of GM and non GM flax along the supply chain is a fundamental concern of the 
Protocol. Therefore, understanding the flaxseed supply chain is essential to undertaking 
estimates of the economic impacts associated with the adventitious presence of GM flax in the 
flaxseed supply chain. 
 
5.2 The flaxseed supply chain 
The flaxseed supply chain includes all activities occurring between the production of flaxseed 
and its final use by consumers. Here commercial production of flaxseed on farms for commercial 
use is considered as the production. In addition, the flaxseed production of plant breeders and 
commercial seed multipliers is also included in the supply chain as planting seed played an 
important role in CDC Triffid flax incident. As the production of flaxseed is a comparatively 
small industry in Canada, there is little published information pertaining to the supply chain. This 
chapter, however, develops stylised picture, or model, of the flaxseed supply chain based on the 
available information. The model is used as a basis for estimating the costs associated with the 
adventitious presence of CDC Triffid. 
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Figure 5.1 illustrates the conventional flaxseed supply chain. Flaxseed plant breeders, 
commercial seed multipliers, flaxseed producers, grain handling companies and consumers are 
the main actors in the supply chain. In addition, the Flax Council of Canada, the Canadian Grain 
Commission, Agriculture and Agri-food Canada and the Saskatchewan Flax Development 
Council also play major role in the industry. As a result of the CDC Triffid event, the cost borne 
by all of these stakeholders has increased. The main additional costs are associated with testing 
for GM flaxseed and the segregation of GM comingled flaxseed and GM free flaxseed. 
Therefore, to estimate the total cost associated with the EU‘s closing of the market for Canadian 
flax due to CDC Triffid contamination, the costs borne by each of the stakeholder categories has 
to be evaluated separately. Figure 5.2 illustrates the new model for supply chain after 
implementation of sampling and testing for GM flaxseed and segregation of GM comingled and 
GM free flaxseed. 
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Figure 5.1: Conventional Flaxseed Supply Chain                              
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This CDC Triffid event has created two scenarios for the supply channel for flaxseed. Firstly, 
there are flaxseed lots that have failed the test for being CDC Triffid free. Secondly, there are 
seed lots that pass the test and are CDC Triffid free. Based on the results of the tests, the 
direction of the seed flow may change. Seed lots with positive results may divert from the 
traditional seed flow to the EU, instead going to markets not sensitive to GM flax; for example, 
China, the US or the domestic market. The primary market for CDC Triffid free flax is the EU. 
Figure 5.2 illustrates the main changes in the flaxseed supply chain after the CDC Triffid event. 
Other than the EU, CDC Triffid free flax will go to Japan and Brazil as well.  
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Figure 5.2: Model for flaxseed supply chain after the CDC Triffid issue  
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As shown in Figure 5.2, the flaxseed supply chain has become more complicated since the GM 
event. There are additional costs of handling GM free and GM comingled flaxseed. The 
important additional costs are the cost of testing (CTe) and cost of segregation (CSe) along the 
supply chain. However, there are number of other costs (COt) that can be incurred along the 
supply chain due to the CDC Triffid event. By summing up these additional costs, Total 
Additional Cost (TACCanada) can be estimated. In addition, due to lower prices and changes in 
exports volumes there are changes in revenue derived from flaxseed exports after the CDC 
Triffid event.  
                   
  
TACCANADA = Total Additional Cost in Canada 
CTe  = Cost of testing 
CSe  = Cost of segregation  
COt  = Other costs 
n  = Number of stakeholders 
 
In the case of the EU, the flaxseed industry also incurred extra cost related to the Triffid event. 
The total additional cost in the flaxseed supply chain on EU side are associated with; decrease in 
the profit received by linseed oil producers, recalled products containing GM flaxseed, destroyed 
products that tested positive for GM flaxseed, storage cost of product removed from the supply 
chain due to uncertainty in the market, customers' claims for having to deal with GM positive 
products and shutting down operations due to lack of flaxseed. By summing up these costs, Total 
Additional Cost (TACEU) associated with the supply chain of the EU can be estimated
37
. In 
addition, due to tighter supply condition and higher prices, flaxseed imports to EU changed  
considerably.  
 
                                                          
37
 No legal fees or liability payments are included in estimating the Total Additional Cost of the EU. 
∑ 
i=1 
n 
CTe + TAC Canada = COt  CSe + ∑ 
i=1 
n 
∑ 
i=1 
n 
76 
 
        
TACEU =     Dpr +  Rp +       Dp +          Sc +       Cc +          Sdo 
 
TACEU  = Total Additional Cost in the EU 
Dpr  = Decrease in profit 
Rp  = Recalled products 
Dp  = Destroyed products 
Sc  = Storage cost (blocked products) 
Cc  = Customers' claims 
Sdo  = Shutting down operations 
n  = Number of stakeholders 
 
Section 5.3 illustrates the different costs borne by different stakeholders. Furthermore, it gives a 
detailed explanation of the stakeholders along the supply chain. In addition, the section explains 
how the estimation of additional costs along the supply chain is undertaken for this thesis.  
 
5.3 Cost borne by different stakeholders in Canada due to CDC Triffid event 
 
5.3.1 Plant breeders 
There are three main flax breeding programmes in Canada. These are the Agriculture and Agri-
food Canada programme located at the Morden Research Centre in Manitoba, the Crop 
Development Centre (CDC) programme located at University of Saskatchewan, and the Viterra 
programme located in Vegreville, Alberta (Murrell, 2011). The CDC‘s flax breeding programme 
has been a major provider of flax varieties to farmers and the Agri-food industry in western 
Canada. More than 80 percent of flax acres in western Canada are planted with CDC flax 
varieties (Murrell, 2010). 
∑ 
i=1 
n 
∑ 
i=1 
n 
∑ 
i=1 
n 
∑ 
i=1 
n 
∑ 
i=1 
n 
∑ 
i=1 
n 
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According to Statistics Canada (2010d), two flaxseed varieties from the Crop Development 
Centre tested positive for trace amounts of CDC Triffid. Therefore, all pedigreed seed stocks of 
CDC Mons and CDC Normandy will be deregistered by the CFIA. In addition, CDC Bethune, 
CDC Sanctuary and CDC Sorrel have also shown traces of GM material and will be re-
constituted from single plants of the pre-breeder seed (Murrell, 2010). Testing leaf tissue for 
FP967 and maintaining a winter nursery in New Zealand for these three varieties adds another 
set of costs to the flax breeding programmes (Booker, 2010). Further, the Crop Development 
Centre is planning to develop their own lab to test for CDC Triffid by 2010. At present, they are 
testing flaxseed for GM in private labs
38
. Furthermore, there are opportunity costs of professional 
time and effort of the plant breeders which is expended to deal with this issue. According to 
Murrell (2010), the loss of reputation for the CDC and the loss of good will is also a significant 
loss. Table 5.1 shows the estimated additional cost borne by Crop Development Centre due to 
the CDC Triffid event. 
Table 5.1: Additional Cost borne by flax breeders in 2009/2010 crop year
39
 
Cost Category Cost ($) 
Breeder seed testing     28 000 
Testing leaf tissue for CDC Triffid     40 000 
Maintaining winter nursery in New Zealand     10 000 
Starting a Lab to test CDC Triffid     50 000 
Total cost   128 000 
Source: Booker (2010), Murrell (2010) 
Therefore, as explained by Booker (2010) and Murrell (2010), the CDC spent $ 128 000 in 
2009/2010 to overcome the CDC Triffid event. 
 
 
                                                          
38 20/20 Seed Labs Inc., BioDiagnostics Inc., BioVision Seed Labs, Discovery Seed Labs Ltd, DNA LandMarks 
Inc., Eurofins GeneScan Inc., Genserve Laboratories, Saskatchewan Research Council (SRC), OMIC USA Inc., 
Quantum Biosciences Inc., SGS Brookings, SGS Winnipeg (Flax Council of Canada, 2010g). 
 
 
39
 01, August 2009 to 31, July 2010 is considered as 2009/2010 crop year. 
 
78 
 
5.3.2 Seed suppliers 
SeCan is the largest supplier of certified flaxseed to western Canadian farmers. It is a private, 
non-profit, member-owned corporation (SeCan, 2008). The members of SeCan are Selected, 
Foundation, Registered and Certified
40
 Seed Growers. SeCan carries nearly nine flax varieties 
with the most popular varieties being CDC Bethune and CDC Sorrel. There are around 85 
Certified Seed Growers, 37 Registered Seed Growers, 12 Foundation Seed Growers and two 
Selected Seed Growers of these two varieties (SeCan, 2008).  According to Booker (2010), the 
total quantity of certified CDC Bethune and CDC Sorrel seed sold by SeCan in 2010 was 6 903 
tonnes. The Canadian Seed Growers Association recommends that commercial seed producers 
should test each 10 tonnes of their pedigreed seed for CDC Triffid. The cost of testing one 
sample was $240. This adds extra cost to commercial seed producers. As CDC varieties 
represent 80 percent of the total flaxseed production on the prairies, the extra cost associated 
with these two varieties can be considered as the main extra costs faced by seed producers due to 
CDC Triffid event. Therefore, approximately $165,672 likely has been spent by commercial seed 
growers for seed testing. See Table 5.2. This is an underestimated value as the actual amount of 
certified seed sold in 2010 is higher if other flaxseed varieties are also considered. 
 
Table 5.2: Additional cost of testing certified flaxseed  
Cost Category  Cost ($)  
 
Total cost of testing certified seed in 2010  
 
(6903/10)*240=$165,672  
Source: Author‘s calculations 
 
                                                          
40
 Selected, Foundation and Registered seed are usually non-commercial seed classes available as planting stocks to 
certified seed production.  They are grown in limited quantities and monitored for varietal purity. Certified seeds are 
sold to commercial farmers for general crop production (Copeland and MacDonald, 2001). 
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Furthermore, the CDC Triffid event adds another set of costs to seed producers due to intensive 
measures taken to prevent comingling of GM seeds at farm level. In section 5.3.4.2 the cost of 
segregation faced by certified seed suppliers is estimated.  
 
5.3.3 Producers 
In this thesis any person operating a farm in western Canada who is engaged in the production 
of, and marketing of, flaxseed is considered as a producer. In addition, this thesis does not 
distinguish between conventional flaxseed producers
41
 and organic flaxseed producers. The 
number of registered flaxseed producers in Saskatchewan is 12,000 (SaskFlax, 2009c) and in 
Manitoba the number of producers is 500 (Manitoba Flax Growers Association, 2011). 
 
In the 2009/2010 crop year some producers found CDC Triffid in their crops once they were 
harvested and it was not possible to prevent comingling. The cost they incurred were primarily 
the cost of testing seed lots
42
. Depending on the quantity of their production, they may have to do 
several tests. According to SaskFlax (2010), each producer should have submitted a sample of 1 
kg for every 75 to 125 tonnes (3,000 to 5,000 bushels) of a producer‘s total flax inventory. If 
producers have more than 125 tonnes of flaxseed they should test samples of each additional 125 
tonnes of flax seed. The cost of each test was $105 up to September 1
st
 2010. From September 1, 
2010 producers have had to pay $240 for intensive testing of four subsamples from an initial two 
kg sample. All four subsamples should be negative to consider a seed lot to be CDC Triffid free 
(SaskFlax, 2010).  According to the Flax Council of Canada (2010g), the total number of tests 
conducted at the producer level was 6000 in 2010.  
 
To regain their largest market, the Canadian flax industry has been encouraging producers to use 
certified seed for the 2010 crop. Initially, the Flax Council of Canada announced that farmers 
must use certified seed, but later found that some certified seed was also contaminated with CDC 
                                                          
41 In conventional flaxseed production chemical fertilisers, pesticides and herbicides are used while in organic 
flaxseed production no such inputs are used. 
 
42
 However, there are number of other opportunity costs including time spent on taking samples, bringing samples to 
relevant laboratories for testing or cost of mailing samples to laboratories, etc.   
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Triffid. Farmers were subsequently allowed to use their own farm saved seed for 2010, but only 
after testing for CDC Triffid. Producers have to test twice for CDC Triffid if their seed is held 
over for sowing, i.e before cleaning the seed lot and after cleaning the seed lot. According to the 
‗Industry Stewardship Programme for Farm Saved Seed‘ announced by Flax Council of Canada 
(2010f), before cleaning a seed lot a producer has to undertake a 1x 60g test which costs $105 
per each 20 tonnes. If it shows negative results, after cleaning they have to do 4 x 60g tests 
which costs $240 per each 20 tonnes. This is an extra cost in their production. If farmer‘s saved 
seeds test positive for CDC Triffid, the farmers must buy certified seed.  
 
Using a seed rate of 37.5kg/ha and a total seeded area of 431000 ha the total amount of flaxseed 
needed for sowing in 2010 was calculated as 16162 tonnes. Out of that amount, 6903 tonnes 
came from certified seed producers. Therefore, amount of farm saved seed used was 9259 tonnes 
for 2010/2011 crop year. The size of the sample for testing was 20 tonnes. Therefore, number of 
samples tested for farm saved seed should be 462. As of August 2010, producers have tested 
6000 samples of flaxseed (Flax Council of Canada, 2010g). The number of tests done for 
retained seed was 462. Therefore, number of tests done for 2009 crop should be 5538. Table 5.3 
shows the additional cost borne by producers in 2009/2010. 
 
Table 5.3: Cost of testing incurred by producers in 2009/2010 
 Cost Category  Cost ($)  
Cost of test 1for farm saved seed  (((37.5*431000)/1000)-6903)/20* 105  
=  $48510  
Cost of test 2 for farm saved seed  (((37.5*431000)/1000)-6903)/20*240   
= $110880  
Total cost of testing farm saved seed in 2010  $ 48510+ $110880 = $159390  
Total cost of testing 2009/2010 crop  (6000-462)*105 = $581490  
Total cost of testing $740 880  
Source: Author‘s calculations 
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In the 2010/2011 crop year, potential production is forecast to be 537 000 tonnes (Statistics 
Canada, 2010f). The sample size is 125 tonnes and cost per sample is $240
43
. If all the 
production is subjected to sampling and testing as required by the Protocol, the total cost of 
testing 2010/2011crop can be calculated. See table 5.4. 
Table 5.4: Cost of testing incurred by producers in 2010/2011 
Cost Category  Cost ($)  
 
Total cost of testing 2010/2011 crop  
 
(537000/125)*240 = $1 031 040  
Source: Author‘s calculations 
 
Therefore, in 2010/2011 crop year the cost of testing the crop will be $1.03 million. Other than 
the cost of testing, producers may have a number of other costs associated with a GM flax event. 
For example, some of the producers rent storage at primary elevators. Therefore, if the test 
results are delayed, producers have to pay an extra storage cost as well. In addition, if producer 
carry-over stocks have increased due to CDC Triffid being present it adds extra cost for 
producers. Similarly, if the test results proved to be positive, producers get lower prices compare 
to flax seed having negative test results. This can also be considered as a cost for producers. To 
prevent comingling of CDC Triffid, farmers have to clean their harvesting equipments, storage 
bins and trucks used for transporting. In addition, there is an opportunity cost of time spent for 
sampling and also a cost of mailing/courier samples to relevant laboratories. This increases total 
cost of handling and transporting of flaxseed for producers. In Section 5.3.4.2 the cost of 
segregation at the producer level is estimated using the available literature. 
 
5.3.4 Elevator companies  
Based on their functions, elevator companies can be divided into primary collection, process, 
terminal or transfer elevators. There are few processors in the supply chain. Primary elevators 
purchase and take delivery of flaxseed from producers on behalf of grain handling companies. 
                                                          
43
 From January 01, 2011 producers will receive a subsidy of $ 100 for every test from the Flax Council of Canada.  
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They may clean, weigh, sample, grade and load flaxseed before shipping it through the rail 
system to terminals at Thunder Bay and Vancouver or delivering to domestic processors. Farmer 
owned trucks are generally used to deliver flaxseed to primary elevators. To transport flaxseed to 
terminal elevators, the rail system, particularly the Canadian National Railway, the Canadian 
Pacific Railway and the British Colombia Railway, is used. Flaxseed moved eastward through 
the Great Lakes and the St Lawrence Seaway system is shipped in laker vessels (Veeman and 
Veeman, 1984). These laker vessels must off load the flaxseed and reload it on to ocean going 
vessels prior to export. Table 5.5 illustrates that most of the flaxseed is shipped from Thunder 
Bay. It is the most direct route to the EU. 
 
Table 5.5: Export of flax seed by clearance sector in 2008/2009 (000’s of tonnes) 
Country Pacific 
(Vancouver) 
Thunder 
Bay 
Eastern (Sorel, 
Precscot) 
Prairies Total 
Western Europe      
    Belgium - 271 124.1 - 395.1 
    France - 8.4 - - 8.4 
    Germany - 19.3 - - 19.3 
    Total - 298.6 124.1 - 422.7 
Asia      
    China 18.1 - - - 18.1 
    Japan 8 - - - 8 
    Total 26.1 - - - 26.1 
USA 0.1 - 0.2 81.1 81.4 
Grand Total 26.2 298.6 124.3 81.1 530.2 
Source: Canadian Grain Commission (2009c) 
 
According to Canadian Grain Commission (2010e) there are 394 licensed elevators in the 
country. 56 percent of the elevators are owned by four companies. Most of the elevators are 
located in Saskatchewan and most of the primary elevators are owned by Viterra Inc. (101 
elevators), Richardson Pioneer Ltd (54), Paterson Grain (35) and Cargill Ltd (34). Table 5.6 
shows the distribution of elevators in different provinces. 
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Table 5.6: Number and type of elevators in different provinces 
Elevator 
Type 
Manitoba Saskatchewan Alberta B.C Ontario Quebec Montreal Total 
Primary 77 162 79 5 0 0 0 323 
Process 11 20 11 1 1 0 0 44 
Terminal 1 0 0 7 7 0 0 15 
Transfer 0 0 0 0 5 6 1 12 
Total 87 185 87 13 13 6 1 394 
Source: Canadian Grain Commission (2010e) 
 
As a requirement of the Canada Grain Act, elevators must be licensed by the Canadian Grain 
Commission. As a condition of licensing, an elevator must provide a security deposit to the 
Canadian Grain Commission. This risk reduction instrument is used to compensate flaxseed 
producers in the event they are not paid for the flaxseed they deliver to the licensed company 
(CGC, 2010f). Elevators licensed by the Canadian Grain Commission can charge for grain 
handling services and then deduct these costs from grain delivery payment of producers. 
Primary, terminal, transfer and process elevator charges including; elevation, removal of 
dockage, storage, cleaning as requested by the owner of the grain or screenings, drying as 
requested by the owner of the grain or screenings, blending and other services performed by the 
elevator company may be deducted. After the CDC Triffid event, grain handling companies have 
to handle flaxseed in a way that minimises comingling of CDC Triffid. This adds an extra cost of 
segregation to total handling cost.  
 
5.3.4.1 Cost of testing for CDC Triffid at elevator level 
Cost of testing is one of the main additional costs borne by grain handling companies due to the 
GM event. According to the sampling and testing Protocol, all the flaxseed that moves along the 
supply chain should be tested for CDC Triffid flax. Table 5.7 shows the volumes of flaxseed 
exported since the introduction of Protocol to September, 2010. 
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Table 5.7: Changes in flaxseed export after the CDC Triffid issue (000’s of tonnes) 
 Oct-09 Nov-09 Dec-09 Jan-10 Feb-10 Mar-10 Apr-10 May-10 Jun-10 Jul-10 Aug-10 Sep-
10 
EU 
0 0 54.3 33.8 55.4 0 15.7 60.6 11.3 27.7 0 
39.8 
China 
0 11 55.2 19.2 0 43.7 27.4 0 8.8 42.3 0 
0 
US 
8.3 10.3 19.6 10.6 7.1 15.6 8.4 14 13.8 11.8 9 
3.3 
Japan 
0 0 0 0 0 1.8 0 0 0 0 0 
0.8 
Total 
8.3 21.3 129.1 63.6 62.5 61.1 51.5 74.6 33.9 81.8 9 
43.9 
Source: CGC (2008 - 2010) 
Using these export volumes and the sample sizes assigned by the Protocol, the cost of testing for 
CDC Triffid at the elevator level can be estimated. Here, two scenarios have been considered. 
Firstly, the testing cost is estimated for total exports to all the countries. Secondly, if export 
volumes to EU can be separated at the elevator level, testing can be done only for that amount of 
flaxseed. 
From October 2009 to March 2010, grain handling companies have done rail car testing for CDC 
Triffid when the seed moves from a primary elevator to terminal elevators. Since March 2010, 
after the revising of the Protocol, grain handling companies have also tested for CDC Triffid 
when the flaxseed is unloaded into silos at terminal elevators. Based on this information, the total 
cost associated with testing at rail cars and silos can be estimated.  The sample size at the rail car 
level is 500 tonnes and sample size at silo level is 1000 tonnes.  The cost of testing one sample is 
$240. Table 5.8 shows the results. 
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Table 5.8: Costs associated with testing flaxseed at railcars and silos  
Time 
period  
Cost of rail car 
tests (EU only)  
Cost of rail car 
tests (all the 
countries 
including EU)  
Cost of silo tests 
(EU only)  
Total cost  
(EU only)  
Total cost 
(exporting 
to all the 
countries)  
October-
2009 to 
February-
2010  
(143500/500)* 
240  
= $68880  
(284800/500)*240  
= $136560  
- $68880  $136560  
March-
2010 to 
September- 
2010  
(155100/500) 
*240 
=$74400  
(355800/500)*240  
= $170640  
(155100/1000)*240 
=$37200  
$111600  $207840  
Total cost  $143 280  $307 200  $37 200  $180 480  $344 400  
Source: Author‘s calculations 
The results reveal that flaxseed exported to EU since the introduction of the Protocol was 
associated with extra testing cost of $180 480. If all the exporting countries including EU were 
considered, the extra cost of testing was $344 400. During this period, from October 2009 to 
September 2010, the total flaxseed exported was 640 600 tonnes. Therefore, the additional cost 
of testing per tonne of flaxseed at elevator level was $0.53. In the case of exports to EU, the cost 
of testing per tonne of flaxseed was $0.60. In the 2010/2011 crop year 550 000 tonnes of 
flaxseed is forecast to be exported (Agriculture and Agri-food Canada, 2010). If 73 percent of 
that amount will be exported to EU, the total cost of testing at the rail car and silo level can be 
estimated. See Table 5.9. 
Table 5.9: Cost of testing rail cars and silos for 2010/2011 crop 
Cost Category Cost $ 
Cost of rail car testing of total exports (550000/500)*240 = $264000 
Cost of rail car testing of exports to EU ((550000*.73)/500)*240 = $192720 
Cost of silo testing to exports to EU ((550000*.73)/1000)*240 = $96360 
Total cost of testing to exports to EU $289080 
Source: Author‘s calculations 
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The results reveal that in 2010/2011, if exports to EU become 73 percent of total exports, the 
flaxseed industry has to pay approximately $0.29 million for testing according to procedures laid 
out in the Protocol.  
 
5.3.4.2 Cost of segregation 
Other than testing costs, grain handling companies incur costs associated with differentiating 
CDC Triffid containing and CDC Triffid free seed lots. The terms identity preservation (IP), 
segregation and traceability are used in the literature to describe differentiation of GM and GM-
free products. According to EU‘s Directorate General for Agriculture (2003) segregating implies 
setting up and monitoring of separate production and distribution channels for GM and non-GM 
products. The focus of segregating is to ensure that the special trait is not commingled with other 
products (Smyth and Phillips, 2002b). According to Buckwell et al. (1998), identity preservation 
(IP) is a system of crop management and supply chain management that allows the source and/or 
nature of material to be identified along the supply chain. In the case of CDC Triffid, the 
differentiation has the characteristics of both IP and segregation. Prevention of comingling of 
CDC Triffid is a part of government regulations for managing the supply chain for flaxseed. It 
was precipitated by the consumer requirements in the EU and the liability of grain handling 
companies. The present flaxseed differentiation system allows identification of the CDC Triffid 
free flax in the supply chain due to the sampling of product at different stages of the supply 
chain.  As explained in Section 3.2, grain handling companies keep a sample of each producer 
delivery at the primary elevator level. At the rail car level and terminal elevator level samples 
must also be kept for further testing if necessary. If comingling is identified, these samples 
would be used to determine the source of comingling in the supply chain. 
To estimate the cost of differentiating CDC Triffid free flaxseed, the available data on cost of 
segregation and cost of IP for other grains are used as a proxy. According to Lin and Johnson 
(2003), segregation could add about US$0.22 per bushel to the cost of handling non-biotech corn 
from country elevators to export in United States in 2000/2001 crop year. When adjusted for 
inflation
44
 this value becomes US$0.30 in 2009.  Lin and Johnson (2003) also report the result of 
                                                          
44
 Producer Price Index (PPI) for all commodities in USA:  2009= 178.1, 2003=139.5, 2001=128.1, 1982=100 (US 
Dept. of Labour, 2009). 
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a survey done by Protein Technologies International which estimated the cost of segregation for 
2001 nonbiotech soybeans at US$0.18 per bushel from country elevators to export elevators. 
Adjusted value of US$0.18 for inflation is US$0.25 in 2009. By taking the average value of these 
two i.e. US$0.265 and assuming that value is similar to segregation cost for Canadian flaxseed, 
the total cost of segregating flaxseed from country elevators to export elevators can be estimated. 
When converted to Canadian Dollars US$0.265 was equal to CA$0.278
45
 in 2009 (Bank of 
Canada, 2010).   
 
As one flaxseed bushel equals to 25. 4 kg (1 flaxseed bushel= 56 lb), cost of segregating of one 
tonne of flaxseed can be estimated to CA$ 10.94 ((0.278/25.4)* 1000). However, the level of 
tolerance in non-biotech corn is five percent while level of tolerance in GM free flax is 0.01 
percent. As explained by Isaac et al. (2005) ensuring this high level of purity would be 
unacceptably costly and infeasible. Therefore, the cost of segregation found here is likely an 
underestimated value.  
There are a number of other studies that have estimated the cost of segregating non-GM crops 
and those values can be used when deciding the proxy value for cost of flaxseed segregation. 
Buckwell et al. (1998), have estimated IP costs for number of crops in the US, Brazil and 
Canada. Out of these findings, the IP costs for oilseed rape in Canada is used in estimating a 
proxy value in this thesis as it is closer to the cost of segregation provided by Lin and Johnson 
(2003). According to Buckwell et al. (1998), the average cost of IP for the farm level, transport 
and storage stages of the supply chain for oilseed rape in Canada in 1998 was US$8.13 per 
tonne. Here, cost of testing was not considered as it was estimated as a separate cost component 
in the present research. When first adjusted for inflation
46
 and then converted to CA$ this 
becomes CA$10.88 in 2009 (8.13*(121.1/95)*1.05).  
                                                          
45
 1 USD = CA$ 1.05 in 2009 (Bank of Canada, 2010). 
46
 Farm Product Price Index of Canada: 1997=100, 2000=95, 2004=99.4,  2008=121.1 ( Statistics Canada, 2010g). 
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Huygen et al. (2004) provides an estimate of IP costs in the supply chain for wheat in Canada. 
See Table 5.10. In that research, different IP costs have been estimated for different tolerance 
levels of GM wheat in GM free wheat.  
Table 5.10: Cost of differentiating GM free wheat in Canada 
Cost Category 
Cost at Tolerance levels 
(CA$ per tonne) 
Farm IP cost 5% 0.10% 
Volunteer Control 0.84 5.15 
Cleaning
a 
     Seeder 0.02 0.08 
   Combine 0.06 0.26 
   Truck 0.01 0.03 
   Semi 0.01 0.03 
   Bin 0.01 0.08 
   Dryer 0.01 0.04 
   Auger 0
* 
0.02 
   Combine flush 0.02 0.04 
Total farm IP cost 0.98 5.73 
Primary elevator IP cost 
  Clean
b
 receiving 0
* 
0.02 
Clean storage 0.01 0.02 
Clean shipping 0
* 
0.01 
Capital expenditure
 
0.05 0.19 
Total primary elevator IP cost 0.06 0.24 
Terminal elevator IP cost 
  Clean
c
 receiving 0.01 0.02 
Clean storage 0
* 
0.01 
Clean shipping 0
* 
0.01 
Capital expenditure
 
0.01 0.05 
Total terminal elevator IP cost 0.02 0.09 
Fixed IP: elevators (training, 
legal costs) 0.30 0.30 
Cost of coordination at all levels 3.75 3.75 
Total IP cost 5.11 10.11 
Source: Huygen et al. (2004)  
( a $15/hour wage applies for mechanical cleaning, b  $16/hour wage applies for mechanical cleaning,    c $27.29/hour 
wage applies for mechanical cleaning) 
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The results of the research reveal that when threshold level become more stringent, IP cost 
increase non-linearly. Out of the range of IP costs estimated, costs related to a 0.1 percent 
tolerance level was chosen as applicable for this research. Huygen et al. (2004) clearly show that 
when the level of tolerance decreases, the IP costs increases considerably. In particular, cost of 
volunteer control increased significantly when the tolerance level decreases from five percent to 
0.1 percent. Therefore, using the IP cost values given for 0.1 percent tolerance level to estimate 
the cost of segregating flaxseed having 0.01 percent tolerance level may lead to an 
underestimation. According to Huygen et al. (2004), total IP cost of moving wheat from primary 
elevator to export elevator was CA$4.38 per tonne at 0.1 percent tolerance level. When adjusted 
for inflation it becomes CA$5.33 in 2008 (4.38*(121.1/99.4)).  
From the segregating costs found in literature, the value given by Huygen et al. (2004) was used 
as the proxy value for the present study because it is more closely related to the Canadian 
flaxseed supply chain. However, the values given by Lin and Johnson (2003) and Buckwell et al. 
(1998) were helpful in understanding the approximate cost of segregating GM free grains in a 
supply chain. It is interesting to note that segregation costs in the present study are the costs of 
preventing comingling of flaxseed lots with GM seeds higher than 0.01 percent and seed lots 
with GM seeds less than 0.01 percent. Therefore, the CDC Triffid event has created new scenario 
in segregation costs in GM and non-GM grains.  
Since the introduction of the Protocol, i.e from October 2009 to September 2010, Canada has 
exported 640.6 thousand tonnes of flaxseed (CGC, 2008-2010). If total exported flaxseed has 
been subjected to the process of segregation along the supply chain from primary elevators up to 
terminal elevators, the total cost of segregation at 0.01 percent level can be calculated. If flaxseed 
exported solely to EU was subjected to segregation, the cost can be calculated in a similar 
fashion. During the period being considered, total exports to the EU were 298600 tonnes (CGC, 
2010c). The results reveal that the total cost of segregation from primary elevators to terminal 
elevators in 2009/2010 was $3 414 398 for total exports and $1 591 538 for exports to the EU; 
see Table 5.11. 
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Table 5.11: Cost of segregation from primary elevators to terminal elevators 
Cost Category  Cost ($)  
Total cost of segregation from primary elevators to 
terminal elevators in 2009/2010 (total exports)  
640600* 5.33= $3 414 398  
Total cost of segregation from primary elevators to 
terminal elevators in 2009/2010 (exports to EU only)  
298600* 5.33 = $1 591 538  
Source: Author‘s calculations 
For the 2010/2011 crop year cost of segregation from primary elevator to terminal elevator can 
be estimated based on forecasted export of 550 000 tonnes. It is assumed that out of the total 
exports, 73 percent will be exported to the EU in 2010/2011. See Table 5.12. 
 
Table 5.12: Cost of segregation 2010/2011 exports 
Cost Category  Cost ($)  
Total cost of segregation of total export $ (550000*5.33) = CA$2 931 500 
Total cost of segregation of exports to the EU $ (550000*.73)*5.33 = CA$2 139 995 
Source: Author‘s calculations 
Table 5.12 illustrates that the total cost of segregation of total export will be $2 931 500 and the 
total cost of segregation of exports to EU will be $2 139 995 in 2010/2011. 
When the Protocol was introduced in October 2009, the 2009/2010 crop was, for most part, 
being stored in producer bins on farm. If producers try to prevent comingling by cleaning their 
trucks when transporting flaxseed to primary elevator that can be considered as cost of 
segregation at farm level for 2009/2010 crop. According to Huygen et al. (2004), cleaning trucks 
cost CA$ 0.03 and when adjusted for inflation it becomes CA$0.036 in 2008 
(0.03*(121.1/99.4)).  After introducing the Protocol producers have tested 5538 samples of 
flaxseed at farm level. Every sample represents 125 tonnes of flaxseed. These values can be used 
to estimate the cost of segregation while transporting to primary elevators. See Table 5.13. 
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Table 5.13: Total cost of segregation at primary elevator level in 2009/2010 
Cost Category  Cost ($)  
Total cost of segregation at farm level (5538* 125)*0.036 = $24 291 
Source: Authors calculations 
Therefore, producers have spent $24 291 in 2009/2010, in order to prevent further comingling of 
CDC Triffid while transporting their flaxseed to primary elevators. Considering forecasted 
production for 2010/2011 crop year, potential segregation cost at farm level can be calculated. 
According to the proxy value given by Huygen et al (2004), cost of segregating flaxseed at farm 
level is CA$6.98/tonne (5.73*(121.1/99.4)). The forecasted production is 537 000 tonnes 
(Statistics Canada, 2010f). Therefore, the cost of segregating total production at the farm level in 
2010/2011 will be $3 748 260; see Table 5.14. 
 
Table 5.14: Total cost of segregation at farm level in 2010/2011 
Cost Category  Cost ($)  
Cost of segregating total production 537 000*6.98 = $3 748 260 
Source: Author‘s calculations 
Therefore, it is apparent that cost of segregation increases considerably if farm level costs are 
included. However, as these costs are estimated for 0.1 percent tolerance level they may give 
underestimated values for a 0.01 percent tolerance level. Based on the farm level segregation 
cost given by Huygen et al. (2004), the additional cost borne by certified seed suppliers can also 
be estimated; see Table 5.15. In 2009/2010 commercial seed producers have produced 6903 
tonnes of flaxseed. 
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Table 5.15: Total cost of segregation of commercial seed production 
Cost Category  Cost ($)  
Cost of segregating commercial seed 
production 
6903*6.98 = $48 183 
Source: Author‘s calculations 
Therefore, in 2009/2010 the cost of segregation incurred by commercial seed producers was $48 
183. However, this may be an underestimated value as certified seed production is more 
intensive than commercial flaxseed growing and thus prevention of comingling may be more 
costly in certified seed production. 
As explained by Smyth and Phillips (2001), the point of co-mingling determination will greatly 
impact the final cost of detection. Once comingling is determined, it is necessary to remove that 
seed lot from the flaxseed supply chain for the EU. If co-mingling is determined on-farm or at an 
inland terminal, the cost would be substantially lower than if detection was made at laker vessels 
or at ocean-going vessel. The reason the cost would be lower is that the volume of co-mingled 
flaxseed is lower on farm or at the inland terminal than in vessels (Smyth and Phillips, 2001). In 
the present study, costs that arise due to a determination of comingling is not estimated due to 
lack of information
47
.  
 
Another cost grain handling companies may face is the demurrage cost if test results are delayed. 
Due to lack of transparency in the testing process, it was not possible to estimate the demurrage 
cost due to delays in tests. Further, if exported seed lots turn out to be positive for CDC Triffid 
when tested at ports in the EU, there would be another set of costs for importers. Since revising 
the Protocol in March 2010, there were no tests done at the EU ports. However, there is a 
possibility of testing at the EU ports as there is no clear indication in the Protocol regarding 
testing in the EU side of the supply chain.  
 
                                                          
47
 The cost of having a test at terminal elevator detect CDC Triffid may result in a reduced value for a large quantity 
of flaxseed arising from a small amount of CDC Triffid. 
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5.3.5 Institutions in flax seed industry 
There are number of institutions supporting the smooth functioning of the flaxseed supply chain. 
Even though they do not physically possess the flaxseed at any point, they play a significant role 
in flaxseed industry of Canada. The CDC Triffid event has increased the cost associated with 
their involvement in the industry. The cost borne by institutions due to the CDC Triffid event is 
considered under the category of ‗other cost (COt)‘ in the model. 
5.3.5.1 The Canadian Grain Commission (CGC)  
The Canadian Grain Commission is a federal government agency. It is the regulator of Canada‘s 
grain handling industry, the official certifier of Canadian grain and the scientific research 
organisation on grain quality for Canada. The Canadian Grain Commission protects the rights of 
Canadian grain producers when they deliver their grain to licensed grain handling companies and 
grain dealers (CGC, 2010g). The main cost face by CGC in the CDC Triffid event was the cost 
of developing and monitoring the Protocol. CGC official had to visit EU to propose the Protocol. 
With the implementation of Protocol, CGC officials are responsible for the sampling and testing 
process at the silo level. Opportunity cost of time and effort of CGC official spent on CDC 
Triffid event would be a considerable amount if calculated. However, due to lack of information, 
cost borne by CGC in the CDC Triffid event was not estimated in this study. 
5.3.5.2 The Flax Council of Canada  
The Flax Council of Canada is an organisation which develops and support markets that will lead 
to increased flax production and exports of flax and flax products. It was established in 1986, and 
governed by a Board of Directors comprised of producers, exporters, manufacturers and grain 
companies. The Flax Council played a major role in the response to the CDC Triffid event. There 
would be a high opportunity cost of time and effort of Flax Council officials. However, 
confidentiality in the industry hinders estimation of the extra costs borne by Flax Council due to 
CDC Triffid event. However, according to the Flax Council of Canada (2010h), from January 1, 
2011, they will provide $1.5 million to cover a portion of western Canadian flax producers‘ and 
seed growers‘ costs of tests to detect the presence of CDC Triffid in seed.  As of January 1, 
approved labs will give producers a discount of 50 percent of the regular cost of testing pedigree 
and farm-saved seed, up to a maximum of $100 per sample. The labs will be reimbursed by the 
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Flax Council for the discounts from the funds of the new initiative. However, this new cost is not 
included in the cost estimation of present study because the new cost represents 2011/2012 crop 
year. 
5.3.5.3 The Saskatchewan Flax Development Commission (SaskFlax)  
Saskatchewan Flax Development Commission (SaskFlax) is an agency established under the 
Agri-food Act 2004 of Agri-food Council of Government of Saskatchewan. SaskFlax, represents 
over 12,000 registered flax producers in Saskatchewan. It aims to enhance flax production in the 
province to gain the maximum return to producers.  The main areas of concern are market 
development, research, leadership and communication in the industry.  A mandatory check-off 
system (but refundable) enables the Commission to support market facilitation activities of the 
flaxseed and flax fibre industries in the province (Saskflax, 2010).  
Adventitious presence of CDC Triffid has already caused considerable extra expenditure for 
SaskFlax.  There have been three Conference Calls conducted by SaskFlax to communicate with 
producers and one Conference Call to discuss the issue with relevant officers of the Government 
of Saskatchewan. Further, a newsletter explaining the CDC Triffid issue and how to take a 
representative sample has been distributed among 10 500 flaxseed producers in Saskatchewan. In 
addition, SaskFlax has reserved 40 hours a month solely to talk to producers regarding the 
updates pertaining to the presence of CDC Triffid over the phone. The total cost associated with 
CDC Triffid event to SaskFlax in 2009/2010 was $70900 (Braun, 2010). In general, SaskFlax 
expects to spend $100,000 in 2010-2011 to deal with the CDC Triffid issue (Braun, 2010).  
5.3.5.4 Manitoba Flax Growers Association  
Manitoba Flax Growers Association is established under the Regulation 119/2008 of the 
Agricultural Producers‘ Organisation Funding Act of the Government of Manitoba. The purpose 
of this regulation is to enable the association to collect money from flax producers and solin 
producers to promote and financially support initiatives in the areas of production, marketing, 
extension, education and research (Government of Manitoba, 2008). There are approximately 
500 flaxseed producers in Manitoba (Manitoba Flax Growers Association, 2011). Being a new 
and small association they depended for the most part, on the Flax Council of Canada to deal 
with the Triffid event. Therefore, the cost borne by Manitoba Flax Growers Association in the 
case of Triffid event was considered as negligible in the present study.  
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5.3.5.5 Agriculture and Agri-food Canada 
According to Statistics Canada (2010e), Agriculture and Agri-food Canada has pledged up 
to $5.9 million in funding to the Flax Council of Canada to help create new flaxseed varieties 
and to develop an improved method for flaxseed testing. Out of that fund, $1.9 million will come 
from the Canadian Agricultural Adaptation Program (CAAP) to develop sampling and testing 
methods to identify the presence of genetically modified flaxseed in Canadian flaxseed exports. 
 
5.4 Total Additional Cost associated with CDC Triffid event in Canada 
When additional costs incur by stakeholders are summed, the total additional cost faced by the 
flaxseed industry after the CDC Triffid event is estimated. Two scenarios were considered i.e, 
exports to the EU only and total exports to all the countries; see Table 5.16.  
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Table 5.16: Total Additional Cost to the Flaxseed Industry of Canada in 2009/2010 ($) 
Stakeholder Cost category Scenario 1 Scenario 2 
  
 
Exports to EU  Total exports 
  
    
Flaxseed Breeder (CDC) CTe 28 000 28 000 
  COt 100 000 100 000 
  Total 128 000 128 000 
  
  
Certified seed suppliers 
(Secan) CTe 165 672 165 672 
  CSe 48 183 48 183 
  Total 213 855 213 855 
   
  
Producer CTe 740 880 740 880 
  CSe 24 291 24 291 
  Total 765 171 765 171 
  
  
Grain elevator companies CTe 180 480 344 400 
  CSe 1 940 900 4 163 900 
  Total 2 121 380 4 508 300 
   
  
SaskFlax COt 70 900 70 900 
  
  
 Agriculture and Agri-
food Canada COt 1 900 000 1 900 000 
  
  
  
Total additional cost 
(TAC) 
 
5 199 306 7 586 226 
  
  
  
Source: Author‘s calculations 
According to the estimations given in the Table 5.16, it is apparent that CDC Triffid event has 
caused significant additional cost to the industry. In the case of export to the EU only (scenario 
1), additional cost was approximately $5 million and in the case of total exports to all the 
countries it was approximately $7.5 million. 
In the case of total exports to all the countries total cost of testing was $1 278 952 and total cost 
of segregation was $4 236 374. The additional cost borne by grain handling companies was the 
highest cost among the stakeholders in 2009/2010. Second highest cost was borne by Agriculture 
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and Agri-food Canada. However, there is a lack of information about the cost borne by a number 
of institutions that play a major role in the flaxseed industry. Also, most of the estimations were 
based on tolerance level higher than 0.01 percent. Therefore, the total cost figures given here are 
underestimated values rather than the actual cost to the industry. 
For 2010/2011 crop year total additional cost is estimated based on the forecasted total exports 
by CGC (2000-2010). Table 5.17 illustrates the results. It clearly shows that cost of testing for 
producers has increased compare to 2009/2010. The additional cost borne by producers is the 
highest cost among the stakeholders in 2010/2011. 
 
Table 5.17: Total Additional Cost to the Flaxseed Industry of Canada in 2010/2011  
Stakeholder Cost Category Cost $ 
    Exports to EU Total exports 
    Flaxseed Breeder (CDC) CTe 28 000 28 000 
  COt 50 000 50 000 
  Total 78 000 78 000 
 
  
  Certified seed supplier 
(SECAN) CTe 165 672 165 672 
  CSe 48 183 48 183 
  Total 213 855 213 855 
 
  
  Producer CTe 1 031 040 1 031 040
  CSe 3 748 260 3 748 260 
  Total 4 779 300 4 779 300 
   Grain elevator companies CTe 289 080 264 000
 
CSe 2 139 995 2 931 500 
 Total 2 429 075 3 195 500 
 
  
  SaskFlax COt 100 000 100 000
    
  Total additional cost (TAC) 7 600 230 8 366 655
Source: Authors calculations 
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According to the results of the Table 5.17, the CDC Triffid event will cost an additional $7.6 
million to the flaxseed industry in 2010/2011 if only exports to EU are considered. If total 
flaxseed export is considered the additional cost will be $8.3 million.  It is interesting to see that 
flaxseed producers incur the highest additional cost in 2010/2011. This is mainly due to the 
higher cost of segregation at farm level. Producers have to spend a considerable amount of 
money to prevent comingling in the new crop. In addition, the cost of testing increased in 
2010/2011 due to the mandatory 4x 60g testing requirement of Flax Council of Canada. The 
basic assumption here is exports to EU will be restored in 2010/2011. Therefore, it is apparent 
that even if flaxseed to EU become normal the industry would incur considerable amount of cost 
due to the strict regime put in place to satisfy the terms of the  Protocol.  
5.5 Changes in revenue due to CDC Triffid event 
Other than the cost explained so far, there is a change in revenue due to the CDC Triffid event. 
The main reasons for the change in revenue are the changes in export quantities and decrease in 
prices. To estimate the change, average revenue from flaxseed exports from the 2004/2005 crop 
year to the 2008/2009 crop year was used as a starting point. By taking the difference in average 
total revenue of those years and total revenue of 2009/2010 crop year, the loss/gain is calculated. 
Average flaxseed export to the EU out of total exports was approximately 70 percent. However, 
in 2009/2010 the proportion was reduced to 35 percent due to the CDC Triffid event. That has 
caused $57 798 600 loss of revenue to flaxseed industry of Canada; see Table 5.18. 
Table 5.18: Change in revenue in export to EU only 
Exports to EU Tonnes Price ($/tonne) Revenue ($) 
2004/2005 315000 442 139230000 
2005/2006 355000 259 91945000 
2006/2007 466000 258 120228000 
2007/2008 415000 546 226590000 
2008/2009 430000 500 215000000 
Average 396200 401 158598600 
2009/2010 280000 360 100800000 
Loss in revenue in 
2009/2010 
  
57,798,600 
Source: CGC (2008-2010), Government of Saskatchewan (2010) 
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However, for the decline in price and quantity exported of flaxseed in 2009/2010 there may be 
other reasons than the CDC Triffid event. Therefore, attributing the $57 million decrease in 
revenue in 2009/2010 solely to the CDC Triffid event was an approximation. However, after the 
CDC Triffid event, there was an increase in import demand of flaxseed from China which led to 
an increase in total revenue. The main reason for the change in revenue was the increase in total 
exports compared to the average export in the previous five years. Even with the reduced price, 
this high export quantity resulted in a gain in revenue to the industry. As illustrated in Table 5.19 
it was $12 331 600 in 2009/2010.  
Table 5.19: Change in revenue in total flaxseed exports  
Total exports Tonnes Price ($/tonne) Revenue ($) 
2004/2005 415000 442 183430000 
2005/2006 440000 259 113960000 
2006/2007 579000 258 149382000 
2007/2008 545000 546 297570000 
2008/2009 638000 500 319000000 
Average 523400 401 212668400 
2009/2010 625000 360 225000000 
Gain in revenue in 
2009/2010 
  
12,331,600 
Source: CGC (2008-2010), Government of Saskatchewan (2010) 
From 2004/2005 to 2007/2008 there were only 39 000 tonnes of flaxseed exported to China (7 
percent). However, in 2009/2010, 35 percent of Canadian flaxseed had been exported to China 
(Statistics Canada, 2010f). See Table 5.20. 
Table 5.20: Change in revenue in flaxseed export to China  
Total exports to China Tonnes Price ($/tonne) Revenue ($) 
2009/2010 218750 360 78,750,000 
Average 39000 401 15,639,000 
Gain in revenue    63,111,000 
Source: Author‘s calculations, Statistics Canada (2010f) 
100 
 
If there were no exports to China, the flaxseed industry of Canada would have faced a $63 111 
000 loss in revenue in 2009/2010. However, it is apparent that China is not a stable market for 
flaxseed relative to the EU. The main reason for higher import demand of China was the very 
low prices of Canadian flaxseed in the market.  
 
5.6 Total additional cost associated with CDC Triffid event in the EU 
In the EU, flaxseed importers, storers, distributors and oil crushers are those mainly affected by 
the CDC Triffid event other than consumers. A study conducted by COCERAL and FEDIOL in 
EU gives rough estimate of the size of the additional cost. COCERAL stands for the Committee 
of cereals, oilseeds, animal feed, oils and fats, olive oil and agrosupply trade of the EU. The 
members of COCERAL are the national trade organisations of most of the EU-27 Member 
States. They represent collectors, distributors, exporters, importers and agribulk storers of the 
above mentioned commodities (COCERAL, 2010). FEDIOL is a European industry federation 
representing the European oil and protein-meal industry which is based in Brussels. FEDIOL 
members crush 30 million tonnes of oilseeds a year (FEDIOL, 2010).  
According to the study conducted by COCERAL and FEDIOL (2010), as the available quantities 
of flaxseed for export from countries other than Canada cannot replace the reduction of Canadian 
product entering the EU due to the CDC Triffid event, the incident has triggered a market 
standstill that has caused significant economic losses for the EU linseed market and stakeholders. 
 
Out of the total flaxseed imports of EU, approximately 80 percent is processed by the crushers 
and the remaining volumes are destined to all other uses (mainly food uses). The EU flaxseed 
crushing industry is primarily composed of small/medium size companies. Belgian flaxseed 
operators are mainly equipped to crush only flaxseed and, hence, are not in a position to switch 
to, for example, crushing rapeseed. If sufficient flaxseed at a competitive price is not available 
they have no option other than shutting down their operations.  The crushers usually obtain about 
33 percent crude linseed oil and 64 percent of linseed cake/meal from their operations 
(COCERAL and FEDIOL, 2010). 
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COCERAL and FEDIOL (2010) analysed the economic impact of the EU‘s zero tolerance on 
CDC Triffid flax. Due to low supplies and additional management costs due to the CDC Triffid 
event, flaxseed prices in the EU have increased considerably and that has resulted in decrease in 
profit for the flaxseed crushing industry of EU. Table 5.21 illustrates the estimated extra cost 
related to handling CDC Triffid positive flaxseed in EU during September 2009 to May 2010.  
Table 5.21: Total Additional Cost borne by flaxseed industry of the EU  
Cost Category Cost € 
Decrease in profit 1 700 000 
Recalled products  2 100 000 
Destroyed products  1 300 000 
Storage cost (blocked products)     130 000 
Customers' claims
48
 18 000 000 
Shutting down operations      300 000 
Total Additional Cost  23 530 000 
Source: COCERAL and FEDIOL (2010) 
A large amount of raw material and foodstuffs containing flaxseed (bread, muesli, cookies, etc) 
had to be recalled. For the traders this entails extra costs related to freight, storage and additional 
monitoring and sampling plans. As small proportion of food containing flaxseed has been 
destroyed by the traders. The CA$ value of above Total Additional Cost is $32 000 800
49
.  
5.6.1 Value of forgone flaxseed imports in the EU 
In 2009/2010 the reduction in flaxseed imports of the EU from Canada was 116200 tonnes when 
compared to average imports of the previous five years (CGC, 2000-2010). To understand 
whether this amount was imported from any other country, data on total flaxseed imports to the 
EU was examined using UNcomtrade data. According to that data, total flaxseed imports to the 
                                                          
48
 Cost related to refunds for flaxseed containing  food delivered to customers. 
49
 1 € = 1.36 CA$ in 2010 (Bank of Canada, 2010) 
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EU were reduced by 119944 tonnes in 2009 compare to average total imports over the previous 
four years, see Table 5.22. 
Table 5.22: Trade loss to EU due to low imports in 2009  
Year 
 
Total flaxseed imports to EU 
from the world including 
Canada (tonnes) 
Trade value (US$ 
million) 
 
2005 478360 193 
2006 504150 155 
2007 695843 252 
2008 449993 323 
Average 532086 231 
2009 412142 218 
Reduction in imports 
in  EU in 2009 119944 63 
Source: UNcomtrade (2010) 
Therefore, the reduction of flaxseed imports from Canada has not been offset by imports from 
other countries.  COCERAL and FEDIOL (2010) also support that conclusion. By using the 
estimated total trade loss in the EU in 2009, the loss due to low flaxseed imports from Canada 
can be estimated. 
By using the reduced imports from Canada in 2009, i.e  116200 tonnes and the average price of 
flaxseed in the EU in 2009, i.e US$529.5 (CA$ 540
50
), the value of given up imports from 
Canada can be calculated. The value is CA$62 748 000. Therefore, the flaxseed industry of the 
EU lost flaxseed imports worth of CA$62.74 million in 2009/2010 due to the zero tolerance 
policy of the EU on GM comingled flax from Canada. However, as there are number of reasons 
affecting the changes in price and quantity demanded attributing $62.74 million change in 
imports solely to CDC Triffid flax event was an approximation.  
 
 
 
                                                          
50
 1 US$ = 1.02 CA$  in 2010 (Bank of Canada, 2010) 
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5.7 Conclusion 
According to the estimations made in this study, the additional cost associated with CDC Triffid 
event was considerable for the flaxseed industry of Canada. In 2009/2010, if only exports to the 
EU was considered, the cost was $7.6 million and if total exports to all the countries were 
considered the cost was $8.3 million. In the case of total exports to all the countries total cost of 
testing was $1,278,952 and total cost of segregation was $ 4,236,374. However, there is lack of 
information about the cost borne by number of institutions that play a major role in the flaxseed 
industry. Further, most of the estimates were based on tolerance level higher than 0.01 percent. 
Therefore, the total costs given here would be underestimates of the actual cost to the industry. 
In 2009/2010 the reduction in exports to the EU caused approximately $58 million loss of 
revenue to flaxseed industry of Canada. Market uncertainty associated with Triffid flax event 
may be one of the reasons behind this huge trade loss.  The total exports to all the countries have 
given approximately $12 million worth gain to the industry mainly because of extraordinary 
exports to China.  However, as China is not a stable market for Canadian flaxseed, the best 
solution would be the restoring the EU market by removing the EU‘s zero tolerance to CDC 
Triffid flax.  
In 2010/2011, even if flaxseed exports of Canada to the EU return to normal levels, the industry 
would incur additional costs of approximately $8 million due to the strict regime set by the 
Protocol. In the case of EU, the additional cost associated with the zero tolerance on CDC Triffid 
flax was approximately $32 million as of May 2010 and it was greater than the additional cost 
incurred by flaxseed industry of Canada. Furthermore, the flaxseed industry of the EU lost 
flaxseed imports worth of $62.74 million in 2009/2010 due to the zero tolerance policy of the 
EU.  
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Chapter 6 : Summary and Conclusion 
Flax is one of the major cash crops in Canada. Approximately seventy percent of Canadian 
flaxseed has typically been exported to the EU. In 2009 the EU imposed a trade restriction on 
Canadian flaxseed due to adventitious presence of GM flax variety - CDC Triffid was identified 
in Canadian flaxseed in the EU. The impact of the trade restriction was economically harmful to 
both Canada and the EU. The CDC Triffid event provided the spur for an analysis of the GMO 
policy of the EU in the context of international trade rules.  Both Canada and EU are members of 
the WTO and have made commitments under the WTO and, in particular, the WTO‘s SPS 
agreement. However, they differ over their interpretation of the commitment to market access 
pertaining to the use of science in the decisions to impose barriers to market access. This leads to 
the contentious issue of the EU‘s ‗zero tolerance‘ for GM flax. The EU‘s decision to maintain 
zero tolerance on CDC Triffid flax has been justified on the precautionary principle. 
Precautionary measures are allowed under Article 5.7 of the SPS Agreement in a case where 
relevant scientific evidence is insufficient. However, according to SPS Agreement precautionary 
measures are subject to a scientific risk assessment. As the EU did not base its zero tolerance for 
CDC Triffid flax on any risk assessment the EU is in violation of its commitments under the SPS 
Agreement. Moreover, the EU has not considered the available scientific information on CDC 
Triffid flax which were used to give approval to Triffid flax in Canada. The important question is 
why the EU ignores its SPS Agreement commitment in the case of CDC Triffid flax. In realty, 
there are number of other reasons which outweigh the scientific reasons in the EU decision-
making leading the EU to restrict market access for CDC Triffid. However, the inconclusive 
nature of science‘s role in decision-making allows the EU to claim its restriction is based on 
sound science.  A WTO Dispute Panel is the appropriate mechanism to rule on the current EU 
policy. Furthermore, the non-scientific reasons behind the EU‘s zero tolerance on CDC Triffid 
flax expose other dimensions of GMO debate, such as strong consumer resistance to GMOs in 
the EU.  
The estimation of additional costs associated with the CDC Triffid event in 2009/2010 shows 
that in the case of exports to EU the cost was $7.6 million and in the case of total exports to all 
the countries the cost was $8.3 million. In 2009/2010 the reduction in exports to the EU caused 
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approximately $58 million loss of revenue to flaxseed industry of Canada. Market uncertainty 
associated with CDC Triffid flax event may be one of the reasons behind this huge trade loss.  
The total flaxseed exports to all the countries have given approximately $12 million worth of 
gain to the industry mainly because of extraordinary exports to China.  The significant increase 
of imports of flaxseed by China acted, in part, to offset the economic loss incur by the Canadian 
flaxseed industry in 2009/2010. The prices paid by Chinese importers are much lower than those 
received from the EU buyers. Further, as China is not a stable market for Canadian flaxseed, the 
best solution would be the restoring the EU market by removing the EU‘s zero tolerance for 
CDC Triffid flax. In the case of the EU, for 2009/2010 the additional cost associated with zero 
tolerance for CDC Triffid flax was higher than the additional cost incurred by the flaxseed 
industry of Canada.  
The reasons behind the EU‘s zero tolerance on CDC Triffid flax and the additional costs 
associated with the zero tolerance on flaxseed industry highlight the importance of further 
analysing of GMO policies carefully. Even though new GM crops will increase productivity the 
absence of harmonised GM policies among countries will jeopardise the potential benefits of 
GM crops. The ambiguity associated with the scientific rationale of SPS measures has made it 
relatively easy for countries to misuse science when they need to deny market access for certain 
GMOs.  
 
Limitations of the thesis 
Time and budget were the main limitations of this study. If more time was available a more 
comprehensive review of the use of science in SPS Agreement could have been undertaken. If 
such a review was done it would be a valuable basis for the further development of a scientific 
rationale for the SPS Agreement. If more resources were available for the study, more traveling 
would have been done to collect more data related to the estimation of the total additional cost of 
zero tolerance, not only in Canada but also in the EU as well.  
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Areas of further research 
This study can be expanded into three areas of further research. First is a comprehensive analysis 
of the root causes behind the non-scientific rationale of the EU‘s decision making process 
regarding GMOs. The second area is studying the possible ways of harmonising the international 
trade rules in the case of trading of GMOs. In this area of research, possibilities of strengthening 
the SPS Agreement can be studied. As GMOs are a new innovation, how to incorporate them 
into SPS Agreement in a precise way is a worthy area for further research. The third area is 
conducting a producer survey to estimate on farm costs of testing and segregation related to the 
Triffid event. 
 
Contribution of the thesis 
There are two main contributions of this thesis. First is the analysis of the EU‘s GMO policies 
used to disrupt Canadian flax exports which indicates that they are not compliant with the EU‘s 
SPS obligations. The second contribution is the estimation of total additional cost and changes in 
revenue associated with the operationalisation of zero tolerance policy of the EU. Furthermore, 
LLP of GMOs is a growing concern in international trade. Therefore, this study will contribute 
as a case study useful for the future trade disputes related to LLP of GMOs. 
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